

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"It is true, that some men have been kicked into courage; and this is no bad hint to give to those who are too forward and liberal in bestowing insults and outrages on their passive companions."—BURKE: Letter I. Regicide Peace.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.—From a question of a mere military nature, embracing the conduct, the merits, or the demerits, of Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Hew Dalrymple, this has, in consequence of the subsequent conduct of the ministers, grown into a question of great political importance. From the first, from the tardy reluctant publication of the Extraordinary Gazette, and especially from the partial manner, in which that publication was made, it became evident, that the ministers, though they had not the courage to defend the Convention, had determined to screen, if in their power; had determined to endeavour to screen, their colleague, Sir Arthur Wellesley; and, from the moment that the citizens of London received the rebuking Answer, all men were convinced, that the king had been advised to act in conformity with that determination. It then became a clear question, whether the ministry had the power of defeating the wishes of the whole nation, or not. The nation, with voice unanimous; with an unanimity as perfect as that of their sorrow for the death of Lord Nelson; with such an unanimity, the nation declared the Convention to be *infamous*, and with a like unanimity, they called for a speedy, fair, impartial, and open trial of those, who had made that Convention, who had done the deed, which they deemed to be infamous. Such, and no man will attempt to deny it, were the feelings and wishes of the whole nation; feelings and wishes entirely unconnected with any motives of a party or political nature. Having but too much reason, however, to suspect, that the ministers, from motives of their own, wished and intended to screen one, at least, of the parties concerned in making the Convention, that part of the nation, which generally takes the lead upon such occasions, appealed to the justice of the king himself; laid before him, in language and manner the most respectful and humble that could possibly be conceived, a statement of the nation's wrongs, to which they added a prayer, that he would take measures to do it justice. To this they received an answer of rebuke

for what was called their unnecessary interposition; and, they received no positive assurance, that even an *inquiry* of any sort should take place, much less an assurance, that such an inquiry, that an inquiry of a kind calculated to insure them *justice*, should be instituted. Here, then, the ministers and the people were at issue. The question now became, whether the ministers were able to do that which the whole nation disapproved of, or not; which question still remains to be determined.—A COURT OF INQUIRY is, indeed, said to have been ordered; that is to say, an inquiry to settle the question, *whether there be any grounds for putting the parties upon their trial*. This is something gained by the people and the press from a ministry, who had caused a firing of cannon and an illuminating of houses at the receipt of the intelligence of the Convention; this is something gained from those, who, from the outset, appeared resolved to screen one, if not all, the parties, concerned in making the Convention. But, it is not what the nation wished and expected. It is only in cases where there exist *slight* grounds to presume guilt, that Courts of Inquiry are held; and the only use of such courts, is, to save unnecessary trouble; to save the trouble of putting upon their trial persons, against whom there appears to exist no evidence of guilt worthy of attention. In the case of SIR ROBERT CALDER, who with an inferior force, beat the enemy and took two of their ships, the delicate mode of a previous inquiry was not adopted. In the case of COLONEL COCHRANE JOHNSTONE, against whom not a particle of evidence tending to criminate him was produced; who was not only not proved guilty of any, even the slightest offence, but who *proved himself to be innocent* of every charge that had been hatched and bred up against him; in the case of this gentleman, the Duke of York did not advise the king to institute a previous Court of Inquiry. Colonel Cochrane Johnstone, who proved *all* and every one of the allegations against him to be false and malicious, was sent, at once, before a COURT MARTIAL, where the members are *sworn* and

where witnesses are examined upon their oaths. The delicate, honour-saving mode of a Court of Inquiry was not, in this gentleman's case, thought necessary; and, I should be glad to know what there is to justify this mode of proceeding in the present instance. It was made evident in the sequel, that there was *no wish to spare* Colonel Cochrane Johnstone; it was equally evident, that there was no wish to spare Sir Robert Calder; and, indeed, unless there be a wish to spare, there appears, in cases of importance, no reason whatever for a previous Court of Inquiry. Of such a court the members are not sworn; the witnesses are not sworn; the public are not admitted; all is secret; and, at last, a *report*, decided on by the *majority*, without liability to *public protest*, is drawn up and laid before the king, upon which report a Court-martial is ordered, or the whole proceeding is at an end. —I do not know how others may view this matter, but to me it appears, that a man, conscious of innocence, would not be contented with a trial of this sort, being convinced, as he must, that, if an open *trial* does not follow, the world will always have its suspicions of his guilt. It was said, that Sir Hew Dalrymple would not submit to any thing short of a Court-Martial; and, if he was misled by the information of the person previously in command; if he be able to prove that, as I am inclined to think he is, there was a very solid reason for his objecting to a mode of proceeding, by which his comparative innocence could not be established, or, at least, by which the knowledge of it would be kept from that public, whose resentment has hitherto been directed chiefly against him, and who, for a considerable time, were, through the abominable arts and audacity of the partizans of Sir Arthur Wellesley, induced to regard Sir Hew as the person who *alone* was guilty. —We have before had to remark upon the circumstance of the *Armistice*, (the only document, relating to the transaction, bearing the name of Sir Arthur Wellesley) being published by the ministers in the French language only; we have remarked upon the circumstance of Sir Arthur's coming home, upon *leave of absence*, while Sir Hew was *recalled*; we have remarked upon the gracious reception which Sir Arthur Wellesley met with at *St. James's*, and we have heard nothing of Sir Hew being received there at all; and, if what has been published, as a copy of the Order, for holding a Court of Inquiry, be correct, the same spirit and motive still actuate those, who have the assembling of that Court. "That an Inquiry shall be made

"into the conditions of the Armistice and Convention, and into all the causes and circumstances, whether arising from the previous operations of the British army, or otherwise, which led to them; and into the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of Sir Hew Dalrymple, and of any other commander or commanders, or of any other person or persons, as far as the same were connected with the Armistice and Convention." —Wellesley, you see, though he negotiated the Armistice; and though he had had the previous command of the army, is not *named*. His conduct is, doubtless, included, in the description of the subjects of inquiry; but, why not *name* him? Why name Sir Hew Dalrymple; why hold him up to the world, as a person accused, any more than Sir Arthur Wellesley? Sir Arthur fought us the famous battle on the 21st of September, he negotiated us the famous Armistice on the very next day, and yet he is not named as a person whose conduct is to be inquired into! It appears impossible; to me, at least, it appears impossible, that Sir Hew Dalrymple can be so much to blame as Sir Arthur Wellesley; and yet the name of the former is held up to public notice as that of an accused person, while that of the latter does nowhere appear. The motive for this is too evident to need being pointed out to the reader; and I hope that it will not fail to produce a proper impression, and lead to a strict attention, on the part of the public, to every thing, relating to this transaction, that is now going forward. I do hope, that the public will not suffer its *attention to be diverted* by the numerous stratagems, which will be resorted to for the purpose. All manner of tricks will be played by the partizans of the high Wellesley. The thing will *drawl* along like a snail. Misrepresentations will be made day after day. In the hope that the public will be wearied, its patience will be assailed in all manner of ways, while other topics will be pressed upon its attention, new alarms will be raised, and the passion of fear will be pitted against that of resentment. But, if the people have one grain of sense left, they will, in answer to all these attempts at diversion, say: "stop; for, 'till we have settled the affair of the Convention in Portugal; 'till we have clearly ascertained, whether such an use can, with impunity, be made of the blood and treasure of the nation, it would be folly in us to take an interest in any thing that is liable to happen." This is the answer which every man should give; for, what is it to us that we make

740] exertions and sacrifices, if they are to be of no avail? No: let us have no diversion. Let us have this matter fully and fairly settled; and then we shall know what to wish for and what to hope for and how to act. —While this *Inquiry* is going on, endeavours are not wanting to *reconcile us*, little by little, to the terms of the Convention. There will be found, in another part of this number, a *defence* of the Convention, and of Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the same time. The reader will see how pitiful it is; he will see that all its arguments have been long ago refuted; but, I beseech him to bear in mind the fact, that Sir Arthur Wellesley's friends, asserted, at first, that *he* was quite innocent of any, even the smallest, share in the transaction; that he, as an inferior officer, was *compelled* to sign the Armistice; that he remonstrated against the order so to do; that he was, at last, induced to do it for fear of exciting a mutiny in the army; but, that he privately *protested* against it in the strongest terms. Now, however, when these abominable falsehoods can no longer hope to obtain belief; now, when it is evident that he must come in for a large, and even a principal, share of the blame; now, the Armistice and Convention are things to be defended, and are defended, by the very same persons, who swore that he had protested against those acts, and by this very writer, who accused me of harshness, because I asserted, that the story of the Protest was a miserable fabrication. I do beseech the public to bear in mind this fact, than which I remember nothing exhibiting a more complete proof of want of principle.—The opposition, which, at any place, has been made to petitioning the king upon the subject, has been made, not upon the ground of *justification* of the act. No man has, until now, attempted to set up such justification. In the county of Berks, the Address and Petition was opposed upon the sole ground of their not being necessary; and, even that opposition was confined almost exclusively, to Mr. NARES, who is one of the editors (along with Mr. Beloe of *Museum* memory) of the *British Critic*, who has recently received a fat living from the hands of Lord Eldon; and to Mr. COBHAM, late a purser in the *East-India Company's* service, and who is closely allied to persons dependant upon the government. In Essex, where the meeting was so abruptly dissolved, and where a second requisition has been rejected, the High Sheriff is also a person, who was, I am informed, very recently in the *East India Company's* service. Now, though we are not justified in imputing motives to ei-

ther of these men, still the knowledge of these facts should be circulated, especially as the partizans of Sir Arthur Wellesley have endeavoured to make the world believe, that the opposition, in the places above-mentioned, arose from motives of *pure loyalty*. But, at any rate, no *justification* has, until now, been attempted. Many have been the attempts to shift the blame from the back of Sir Arthur to those of Sir Harry and Sir Hew; but, until now, when the hour of exposure is approaching, no one has attempted to justify the act itself. Such justification, however, we must now expect, in all manner of shapes. The evil consequences of the Convention, which daily become more and more manifest, will, as in the following paragraph from the *Morning Post* (the Nabob's news-paper) of the 8th instant, be imputed, not to those who made the Armistice and Convention, but to those who reprobate them, and who call for the punishment of their authors: "The French writers are naturally delighted at the proceedings of the English Addressers, which we regret to find, have excited the flames of discontent and disorder in Portugal, to a most alarming degree, though in the first instance all was joy and ecstasy at the result of the campaign in that country.—"The Convention of Lisbon," says the *Argus*, "continues to occupy the minds of the people in London. It is not only individuals among the lower classes who loudly deprecate that Convention; even the common council of London presented to the king an Address against the generals who signed it. We are sorry to be unable to give our readers the details of the long debate which took place upon that occasion. It is the finest eulogium of the courage of the French and of the ability of their general."—*The present alarming situation of Portugal affords the best elucidation of the mischievous consequences of the recent proceedings in this country; nor was it difficult to foresee that those ill-judged proceedings, in the very face of his majesty's promise of due investigation, must tend to create dissensions between Great Britain and her ally, to sow the seeds of jealousy and distrust, and give the Portuguese an unfavourable opinion of British honour and integrity.*—Such, in fact, has been the consequence of the outcry, which, without waiting for the promised inquiry, has been factiously raised among us. We sincerely regret to find that many highly respectable, and most worthy individuals have by the

"wiles of party, been seduced to give on this occasion a temporary countenance to the designs of a faction, whose prime object it is to discredit his majesty and his government in the estimation of the country and of its allies, and to bring back to the council of the nation a set of men, who have proved themselves altogether inadequate to direct the affairs of a great nation, under any circumstances, much less to conduct to a happy issue the glorious struggle in which we are at present engaged."—This is an old, well tried trick of Pitt, who, upon pressing emergencies, always resorted to it.—The French writers, we are told, are delighted at the proceedings of the Addressers in England. They do not, by-the-by, express much delight at our proceedings; nor is their reasoning correct, that, because our generals are accused of not doing their duty, we are of opinion that the French generals were superior in ability, and their soldiers in bravery. The contrary, as to the soldiers, is not only the obvious conclusion, but has been, and is, the express assertion of the Addressers. And, I, leave the reader to say, whether the fact, that the people of England, of all ranks, are discontented, because our generals did not send Junot and his army prisoners to England; whether our all being discontented because enough has not been done against the enemy; I leave the sensible reader to say, whether the knowledge of this fact is likely to give "great delight" to that enemy, and to encourage him in the hope of succeeding in his hostile designs against this country.—But, suppose the affirmative of this question? Suppose a case in which our discontent should be goaded on to the pitch of actual insurrection? That would certainly please the enemy, because he might hope therefrom to profit. Yet, the conclusion insinuated by the Morning Post might be false; because the fault might originate with the ministers; with those whose conduct drove the people to insurrection. Suppose a proclamation were issued to compel us all to wear whiskers upon pain of forfeiting our goods and chattels. Suppose we were, under a similar penalty, to be ordered to burn off our fingers, to tear out our nails, or knock out our teeth. Would you accuse the people of giving pleasure to the enemy, if they rose in opposition to such proclamation; or, would your accusation be levelled against those who advised the proclamation to be issued? According to this doctrine of the Morning Post, which is only the old hacknied doctrine of Pitt revived, we are to bear any thing, resent nothing, to keep

silent, though we are expiring under the lash, lest, by uttering our complaints, we give pleasure to the enemy. In the present case, as I have shewn, our complaints must necessarily give pain to the enemy; the enemy does us the justice to say, that we are all discontented that more has not been done against him; and yet these vile defenders of Sir Arthur Wellesley, these base hirelings of the press, would fain persuade us, that to express our discontent upon this occasion is to excite doubts of our attachment to our country and its cause!—Now, to "the alarming situation of Portugal." For this, too, it seems, that, not our Convention-making generals, but the people of England, are answerable. I say, the people of England, because, whether Addressers or not, all have expressed their dissatisfaction at the Convention. We, it seems, and not those who made the Convention, are answerable for the "dissentions, the jealousy, and distrust," now existing in Portugal. What, then, such is the fact, is it? Such is the state of Portugal. The Portuguese are dissatisfied with what our generals have done and are doing; this fact is now acknowledged; but, the cause of their dissatisfaction is the Addresses of the people in England. They were very satisfied with the Convention; at first; they thought it a very good Convention; but we, by our Addresses to the king, and by persevering in these Addresses, "in the very face of his Majesty's promise," have made them believe, that it is a very bad Convention, and, accordingly, their country is in a most "alarming state of discontent and disorder." This is all true, is it? Well, but how does this bear upon the advisers of the king (for we will keep clear of the king himself), if the Portuguese are really in such a situation, and from such a cause? The people call for inquiry; they are rebuked; they appear to distrust the sincerity of those who advised the answer; but, how could this "influence" the Portuguese, unless they distrusted too?—But, it is wrong to waste one's time in this way. It is rank absurdity to suppose, that, if the people of Portugal had "exulted at the result of the campaign," they should have been made discontented by our Addresses and Petitions. It is a barefaced and a base falsehood to say, that they ever rejoiced at that result. On the contrary, it is notorious, that their general remonstrated against the Convention, the moment he heard of it; that the Portuguese caused our flag to be pulled down as soon as our generals had had the folly and the arrogance to hoist it; that great delay in the embarkation took place

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owing to the opposition which the Portuguese gave to the French being allowed to carry off their plunder; that a board of commissioners was formed in consequence of that opposition; that afterwards, when a part of the French were driven into Oporto, the people seized upon their baggage and plunder, in contravention of the terms which our generals had agreed upon. All these are notorious facts; and yet this wretched East-India hireling has the impudence to assert, that the people of Portugal were very well satisfied, and even delighted at the terms of the Convention, till they heard of our Addresses to the king! So far from tending to create dissention in Portugal, the Addresses of the people of England must naturally tend to produce a suspension of discontent. The Portuguese would naturally say: "though we have been injured and insulted by the English generals, the people of that country have taken up our cause, and we shall have justice done us upon the heads of those generals, therefore, we must not confound the nation with its commanders." I leave it to the judgment of the reader, whether such would not be the probable effect of our Addresses. When, indeed, the Portuguese shall see how these Addresses have been received, I will not say, that our addressing may not tend to inflame them; but, then the fault will rest with those, from whose council that reception proceeded. If the answer had been, that such an inquiry would be made, such a mode of proceeding adopted, as would insure ample justice to us and to the Portuguese nation; then, indeed, there would have been good reason for the latter to suspend their resentment.—Who, after we heard of the remonstrance of the Portuguese general, and of the general indignation of the people, expected to see them tranquil? "Rejoice"! Aye, they did, poor creatures, illuminate their houses in Lisbon; but, it was after our generals had established their military police! It was after our army had been converted into a Holy Brotherhood. I, better than any man living, know how easy it is to inspire a city with joy; and our generals, our WELLESLEYS and our HOPES, seem not to be great masters in the art of producing this sort of disposition to illuminate, indeed! Poor souls! What a shame is thus to insult them. Read general Hope's proclamation; and then say, whether they were likely to refuse to do any thing that might be hinted to them as being the wish of our commanders.—Discontent and disorder never appeared in Portugal, till after the Convention was concluded;

and though, in that bare fact, we have not conclusive evidence, that the latter was the cause of the former, it is not bad presumptive evidence, and, when we take into view the facts before mentioned, the unequivocal marks of disapprobation bestowed upon the Convention, there can remain but little doubt of the present dissensions and calamities having arisen entirely from the Convention. Ten or fifteen thousand men, who ought now to be in Spain to meet the French, are, from this cause, kept in Portugal. The friends of the French would naturally recover their boldness upon finding the people discontented with our conduct; comparisons would not fail to be made, and, as the French were gone, it would not be at all surprising if our army supplied their place, in the opinions and wishes of the people as well as in the forts and barracks. The great object should have been so to act as to be able to leave Portugal to itself. We should have so conducted ourselves as to have had Portugal for a friend and not for a dependant. Give to the thing whatever name we please, the Portuguese nation cannot help perceiving, that, as the matter now stands, they have made merely an exchange of masters. We are disposed to act justly by them, I believe; there is, I think, no doubt, that our object is to secure Portugal for the Prince Regent; but, in the meanwhile, we are masters of the country; we seem to be afraid to leave it to itself; and, this fear arises solely from those indications of hostility, which the Convention has brought forth.—And, if this be the case in Portugal, what must be the effect of the Convention upon the feelings of Spain? The Spaniards have all along shown great suspicions of us. They have heard of our conduct in Portugal; they have seen general HORE's Proclamation; they must know all about our Holy Brotherhood; and, can any man imagine, that they will not be shy of us? The Spaniards, if they succeed, must have no sparing of the French; they must have no Conventions of Cintra. This they know well, and, therefore, they must be satisfied, that our commanders will act no such part as that acted in Portugal. They must have no vain blown-up fellows to talk about "Ducs d'Abrantes in person." To give them this satisfaction; to give them an assurance that they would be in no danger from such a source; to excite in them a perfect confidence in the future conduct of our generals; to do this, it was necessary to convince them, that the government as well as the people of England, held in abhorrence the transactions in Portugal. But, what have

they now before them? A Petition of the people to the king, praying that the causes of that transaction may be inquired into, and that the guilty may be punished; and an Answer of the king, advised by his ministers, rebuking and reproving his people for making the application. This is what the Spaniards have before them; this is the security which they have for the good behaviour of our generals, and for their heartily co-operating with them against the Duc d'Abrantes and the other potentates and nobles of Buonaparte's creation. Since one of our generals has acknowledged the emperor Napoleon I. (whom the Spaniards call an *usurper* and a *robber*), how shall they be sure, that another of them, acting under the same ministry, will not, upon the first fair occasion, acknowledge Joseph Napoleon, king of Spain? They have seen Sir Arthur Wellesley, after acknowledging the Duc d'Abrantes and the Emperor Napoleon, graciously received by the king, in a few minutes after the petitioners against him had been rebuked by the king. This they know, if they know any thing that passes here; and will this encourage them to expect from our generals that determined hostility, that implacable hatred, against the French, without which no one can be zealous in *their* cause?—An appeal, in behalf of these generals, has been made to the *compassion* and *gratitude* of the people. It has been said, that we should consider, that the army *venture their lives for us*, while we remain at home in security; and that, therefore, we ought not to act too strictly towards the army.—It is, I hope, far from me to be wanting in any of those feelings, which are due to the soldier or the sailor. But, I consider, that, from them, something is *due to us*; I consider, that, after having been *paid* for years, the soldier actually serves but comparatively a short space of time. If I were to go to the parade at St. James's, or to any of the numerous, the fearfully numerous military stations in this country, and were to say: "What are you all doing here? What use are you of? Here we are taxed to our last shirt to maintain you, a parcel of fellows, who do nothing in this world but prune and black-ball your whiskers, hang monkey's tails to your backs, pipe-clay your belts and your breeches, strut about during the day, and get drunk at night." If I were to say this; if I were to complain of being taxed to support the soldiery in idleness, or in useless parade, the answer would be this: "It is true, that, just at this time, we are of no use; it is true, that, in this

situation, we are a mere burthen, and something worse; but, Sir, recollect, that we are here merely in a state of readiness; and, that when we are called upon actually to serve the nation, *ours* is a service wherein *we venture our lives for you*, which consideration ought to prevent you from complaining that we are not *always at work*." Nothing would be more reasonable than this answer; but, then, this venturing of lives is clearly the nation's *due*. Besides, as to the officers, and more especially the *generals*, and other considerable commanders, not only do they, in venturing their lives, do no more than render the nation what is its due for having maintained them, for years and years upon the staff without any danger to even a hair of their heads; but, they have, moreover, honours and rewards awaiting them for every distinguished service that they, or the soldiers under them perform. Is all this nothing? And, shall military officers not be as strictly accountable for misconduct as other men? Shall there be honours and rewards for glorious deeds, and no punishment for disgraceful ones?—When the question of *flogging* the soldiers was before parliament, I did not observe that either the ministers, or the military officers present, urged this feeling of compassion, or gratitude. If the soldier acts amiss, he is flogged: and, punished, in that, or some other way, he ought to be, and must be; but, then, is there no punishment to await the misbehaviour of generals? Are we, when their conduct is in question, to hear of appeals to our compassion and gratitude, because they venture their lives for us? Does not the private soldier venture his life too? Aye, and that without any hope of obtaining honours or rewards. Yet, if a private soldier, after twenty battles, and covered with scars, were found sleeping on his post, or were to suffer a prisoner to escape, would he not *instantly* be brought to trial, and, if his life were spared, would there be an inch of skin left whole from his nape to his waist? Such punishment would be necessary, though terribly severe. But, then, is not severity equally necessary in the case of the general? Divers lectures have been read, in the parliament and elsewhere, upon the *absolute necessity of strict discipline*. Such opinions are become fashionable, and have been maintained by no set of men with more earnestness, than by the present ministers and their military adherents. But, *now*, it seems, we are to reprobate these notions of severity; or, at least, we are to entertain them as applicable

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to the *soldiers* only. Oh! this is shameful. This is base to the last degree.—There is, in this appeal, and the nation will not fail to perceive it, something strongly indicative of conscious criminality. When a man, accused of theft and threatened with prosecution, reminds you of his distracted wife and starving family, what is your conclusion? And what are we not to think of those, whose partizans make this appeal to our compassion and gratitude? No: we are not to be diverted from our demand of “strict discipline,” our demand of justice, by any such puling appeal. We gave most liberally. We grumbled not at these generals being kept upon the staff for so many, many years, without running the smallest risk of hearing a ball whistle by their heads; we grumbled not that the harvests have partly rotted upon the ground for want of the hands, which were kept in inactivity; we said, take our last penny, but, fight, when the day of fighting comes. That day has come; and, from an expedition, which has probably cost us more, than the whole of one year’s poor-rates, we have derived nothing but injury and disgrace. And, shall we not now look for *strict justice*? Shall our demands of strict justice be answered by appeals to our compassion and our *gratitude*; gratitude towards those, from whom, in return for our unsparing liberality, we have received nothing of which we are not ashamed?—In another view of this matter, who can fail to foresee, that if justice be now denied, or withheld (which is exactly the same in effect), the people will, or can, continue cheerfully to contribute towards the means of supporting the war? If they see expedition after expedition fail; if they see one year’s taxes wasted after another; if they see, battle after battle, and even victory after victory, lead, in the end, to nothing good, but uniformly to something bad; if they see that, having now reached what appears to be the lowest stage of the military bathos, justice is withheld from them: if they see this, is it, I ask, possible, that they should still cheerfully contribute to the continuation of military expenditure; an expenditure amounting to nearly one half of the taxes now raised?—Before I conclude this article, it occurs to me, that some notice is due to the argument, grounded on the assertion, “that our main object was to get the French out of Portugal.” This argument is plausible, because it evidently was one of our objects to get the French out of Portugal; but, the conclusion, at which this fact points, is not the less fallacious. It was our

object to get the French out of Portugal; but, the *means* were to be taken into view; for, it was not our object to accomplish that purpose with a total disregard of the means. Suppose, for instance, our wise and valiant commanders had got Junot to quit Portugal, in consequence of a Convention, that should have sent him, at once, by the nearest cut, to Bilboa; would that have been to attain the intended object? Suppose such Convention had put him in possession of our fleet off the Tagus and had put Cadiz harbour into his hands; or suppose, it had stipulated for the surrender to him of Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Wight. There can be no doubt, but Junot, for either of these, would have consented to leave Portugal, particularly as he was to have ships to carry him away. *The French would have been got out of Portugal*; but, will any man say, that it was our intention, that it was our “*main object*,” to get the French out of Portugal upon such terms? No: it is a crafty, catching sophism, invented to prop a vile cause. To get the French out of Portugal was regarded as the proof of the success of our efforts; but, our main object was, to *defeat the French*, to humble them in the eyes of the world, and, at the same time, to raise our own character for good faith as well as for military prowess and skill. This was the main object; and does not every man’s common sense tell him, that no part of this great object has been accomplished?—As to the *now* magnified numbers, which the French army in Portugal has assumed, it is such a slavish imitation of Falstaff’s lying story of the men in buckram that it were a shame to waste one’s time in a refutation of the falsehood; but, I will just put this question to my reader: whether he believes, that, if Junot had had 25,000 fighting men in Portugal, he would not have been instantly shot, upon his arrival in France?—There is yet one topic remaining.—I beg the public to note the arts, which are now making use of, to excite doubts, at least, in the public mind, with regard to the conduct and merits of Sir Arthur Wellesley.—Scarcely a day passes, but we see some paragraph, in the Nabobs’ newspaper, having evidently this object in view. Take the following two, for instance, from the Morning Post of the 8th instant. “Sir A. Wellesley had a party of his friends at a grand dinner at his residence in the Phoenix Park, on Tuesday last, being the first general invitation given by him since his return from Portugal.—The Lord Lieute-

"nant of Ireland gave a grand military dinner in honour of Sir A. Wellesley, at the vice regal lodge yesterday se'nnight, to which all the general officers were invited." Now, whether the facts be true or false, the intention, obviously, is, to make the public believe, that Sir Arthur has done nothing that he is ashamed of, and that the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and "all the general officers" are of the same opinion. But, whatever this Lord Lieutenant (the Duke of Richmond) may be, in other respects, we all know, that he is one of the ministry; and therefore, his honouring of Sir Arthur Wellesley ought to have no more weight with us, than if the honour had been bestowed by Lord Hawkesbury or Lord Castlereagh. These lords honoured him by presenting him to the king, on the very day, and in the very room, when and where a petition was presented to the king against an act, in which he had a principal share; but, that honour did not silence the nation, who still continue to censure that act, and to express their indignation that any attempt should be made to screen its authors from justice.—But, the most barefaced trick of this sort, is, the Address, which has been published, as presented to Sir Arthur Wellesley, by the officers of the army in Portugal, eulogising his character and his conduct. There are persons, who have had the impudence to appeal to this Address as a proof of the meritorious conduct of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and even as a proof of his innocence of the misconduct, which the nation imputes to him.—In the first place, this is something quite novel in the army. The army has not been looked upon, since the days of Cromwell, as a body proper to deliberate, and especially as to matters relating to the merits of those who are to command it, or who have commanded it.—Next, we may be pretty sure, that where such means of obtaining praise are resorted to, there exists a consciousness of a want of what is really deserving of praise. We see how easy it is for the ministers, at any time, and upon any occasion, to obtain flattering Addresses from their creatures: and, let it be remembered, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was not only known to be one of the ministers, but one of the most powerful of them. People in the army are, as well as other people, sagacious enough to discover which is the road to promotion, and if the reader should happen to think, that none of the officers of our numerous army, have any thoughts about any thing but fighting, he is egregiously deceived. We never heard of any Addresses or pieces of plate being presented, by their

officers to the Duke of Marlborough or Lord Nelson, or to any other of our justly renowned commanders. They left it for the nation, the counties, the cities, the boroughs, and other bodies of the people at home; they left it to the admiration and gratitude of those whom they had served, to present them with Addresses and tokens of regard. The Addressers in Portugal did not think of a sword to present to their hero. A piece of plate they seem to have thought more appropriate; and, to say the truth, their taste was not a little commendable, though a man of the right stamp would assuredly have used it for the purpose of knocking their teeth down their throats. Had they, indeed, presented him with any of the standards, which, doubtless, during such a victorious battle, they took from the enemy, the example of a great captain of the last century, who, with such trophies, made a bed of honour for the king of France, might have been cited; but, to present him with a piece of plate, bought out of their pay, that is to say, out of the taxes; to come to him with a thing, the like of which is given by underwriters to a master of a vessel, who has saved a cargo from the waves; a thing which is given to a meritorious sheep-feeder, or a discoverer of the means of killing the fly in turnips; to furnish him with an article symbolical of thrift, a commodity for a pawnbroker's shop; thus to fit him out! Why, it was very well for them and for him; but, let them not imagine, if another thought of the same cast should come athwart their brains, that the people of England are thus to be duped. No, no, gentlemen, we beg you to leave to us the agreeable task of making due acknowledgment of the merits of your commanders. We, who have long and most patiently been paying you, desire to be left to judge of your merits by your deeds, and not by your words. We wish to hear less of your writing and more of your fighting. Send us home standards; club your swords for that purpose, and do not club your shillings to buy pieces of plate for those, who are able to obtain you promotion. We have sense enough left to perceive, that that general, who is least fond of dangerous enterprises, may frequently be most in favour with his officers. And, as a closing hint (in case this sheet should reach you) you may be assured, that much more acceptable to us, than your endless list of endless letters, abusing the French, would be one single letter of three lines, letting us know that you had beaten them.

Bolley, Nov. 10, 1808.

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* * The Letter below ought to have been inserted last week. It is no longer applicable to its immediate purpose; but, it contains so many just and appropriate sentiments, that I cannot prevail upon myself to omit altogether.

I beg leave to point out to the readers of the Register two admirable letters, signed X. Y. which were published in the COURIER newspaper of the 8th and 9th instant, especially the latter.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates.

The Eleventh Volume of the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, comprising the period from the 11th of April to the close of the last Session, is ready for delivery. In the Appendix to this Volume, besides several valuable Reports, will be found all the Annual Accounts relative to the Finance and Commerce of Great Britain and Ireland; documents which are not to be met with in any other work extant. Complete sets of the Parliamentary Debates, from the commencement in 1803, may be had of the Publishers.

—The Fifth Volume of COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, embracing the period from the Revolution in 1688, to the Union in 1707, will be ready for delivery on the 20th of December.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.

Woodcote House, Hants, Oct. 24.

SIR;—Had I not concluded, that your invitation of the 1st of this month, to the freeholders of this county, to join you in a requisition to the high sheriff to call a county meeting, upon the present most exasperating and mortifying occasion, the inexplicable infamy of this Portugal Convention, would, of course, have been accepted by scores of indignant individuals, I had certainly answered your challenge to remonstrate, as soon as I had read your Register of that day. Since, however, I rather collect from your Register since that date, that such has not been the case; though I am not in the habit of putting myself forward on such occasions, I cannot forbear, though thus late, (if none other has or will) to close with your invitation to petition the king, in respectful, but firm language, for the earliest and the strictest scrutiny into this nauseous transaction; to the end that the author or authors of such an indelible disgrace and scandal to our country, and to manhood itself, may be brought to summary justice, and the most condign punishment; let them turn out to be who they may. In-

stead of parliament being prorogued till Christmas, I cannot but think, as a preliminary to an effectual inquiry into this mysterious business, that it most undoubtedly ought to meet as soon as possible, at least on the day originally fixed upon in next month; that ministers may have an opportunity in their places of setting the public right, whether their doughty generals or themselves, are the fittest objects of blame. I, therefore, Sir, with the deepest indignation at the whole proceedings (the more particulars of which we come at, the worse the case seems to be) do thus formally accept your invitation to remonstrate in the strongest language, and to demand in the firmest tone, the earliest and the most rigid inquiry of the nation assembled in parliament, to rescue, if possible, the insulted and prostituted honour of the country; and on whomsoever the base-born act shall eventually attach, that his or their dastardly heads may fall, as a poor compensation and satisfaction for the gross subjection and prostration of Old England, to the insolent pretensions and intrigues of this execrable Corsican. It is impossible to find language to express one hundredth part of one's feelings on the subject; and how these generals could forbear jumping down Kellerman's throat when he had the consummate impudence to presume to dictate to those who had but the day before drubbed him soundly. I cannot for the life and soul of me conceive. I have not yet heard it asked, how Kellerman came to have such free egress and regress to and from his *tête à tête* with Sir Hew, without (as has as yet appeared) any previous leave or introduction asked; but without even a "by your leave" or "with your leave," he seems to have coolly dropped in upon Sir Hew's head quarters with all the easy familiarity of a brother officer, instead of the cautious and ceremonious admittance of a treacherous and beaten foe. And how Sir Arthur Wellesley (if he really felt as he professes, and wishes us to believe he did, *confident of having done his duty*) how he could possibly think of quitting the army immediately after *two* such creditable victories, and get *leave of absence* to come home, I can as little conceive, as for what purpose; unless (*if* he felt that he *had* acted *right*) impatient perhaps to receive the plaudits and homage of his noble relation the most noble Marquis Wellesley, and his Eastern admirers; or rather, if he felt (as I suspect he *did* feel, and must have felt), that on the contrary he had blasted his military laurels, in his civil capacity as a conventionist; in which case

he would *very* naturally wish to get smuggled home, that he might get (*as he did*) the first word with the ministers, and make his *now* story good. Under the *singular predicament* in which he stood on his return, I should have thought it would have been more natural for the "*mens conscia recti*," to have been at least anxious to clear itself to an indignant public by some address to them, if not to have courted and demanded an inquiry, rather than consent to be *again smuggled off to his post in Ireland*, leaving behind him a most unfavourable impression against him from this very circumstance, in addition to the violent prejudice previously entertained of his conduct in the Portugal cabinet. How his patrons will justify *their* conduct in most *indecently* obtruding him upon the king's notice at the very moment a Petition was actually presenting in the same room, to have his conduct inquired into; and then, as it should seem, in mere contempt and defiance of the avowed sense and feeling of the nation, not only screening, but honouring and rewarding him (*while labouring under this public stigma*) by re-dubbing him a member of the Irish cabinet, I confess I have some curiosity to see. With respect to the Address of the city of London, however the good citizens may have, from their previous conduct, merited a rap on the knuckles, it is no justification whatever of the most insulting folly in the ministers in their palming so thoroughly *ungracious*, not to say *harsh* a reproof upon the king, with the additional preposterous aggravation and contradiction, of calling it his majesty's *most gracious* Answer. I trust the witty wags will not by-and-bye pretend to say it was only meant as a neat piece of *irony* on the Corsican's manner of baptizing his replies to his good city of Paris. Though there be among the ministers, some three or four, deeming themselves cleverish lawyers, surely my learned friends have in this instance travelled out of the record; if not gone beyond their instructions likewise.—Hitherto, whenever I have thought upon the annual threat of invasion, I have always been disposed to consider it as impracticable: but, if this kind of tunnel be carried under the bed of the constitution, if this species of subterraneous and infernal passage be made through the bowels of the country, if this sort of fatal shaft be sunk to the heart and vitals of its existence, as this Portugal Convention is calculated to do; if it be not instantly and effectually dammed up, nothing more practicable than our invasion, nothing easier than Old England's ruin!—I remain, Sir, yours,
—R. L.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.

SIR;—As I have noticed in one of the late Addresses to his majesty, a wish expressed, that those who are guilty, with regard to the late unfortunate Convention, may experience the royal displeasure; and as I think it natural to suppose, that a man would rather subject himself to the displeasure of all the potentates in Europe, than submit to lose the joint of his little finger, I think it my duty to request the insertion of the inclosed plain statement of facts in your justly popular paper, or something of a similar nature in your own energetic language. For my own part, I am so well convinced that in cases of this nature, individual mercy is public cruelty, that I do not hesitate to affirm my belief, that had I pronounced sentence upon General Whitelocke, the Convention of Cintra never would have received the sanction of a British officer; or, at least, he must necessarily have been possessed of more courage than I ever knew man possessed of, who would *dare* even to listen to such an infamous proposal. And as the reason which deters the northern counties from addressing his majesty on this subject, is a belief that a petition with respect to the Convention is a censure on his Majesty's ministers, I have conceived it necessary to remove this prejudice and without the smallest injury to truth: for, if ever there was a time when the honour of the country and the preservation of the constitution required the sacrifice of partial interests, it never was more necessary than at this moment.—I am, respectfully, S.r, &c.—M.—London, Nov. 4, 1808.

TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

To be truly loyal, my countrymen, it is not always necessary to be passive; circumstances sometimes, nay frequently occur, on which, it is the *indispensable duty* of all honest and loyal Englishmen to make known their sentiments to his majesty. First, because his majesty, being a human being like ourselves, is not infallible; and second, because it sometimes happens, that the partial interests of the nobles are put in competition with the true interests and permanent security of his majesty and his people: in the latter case, it surely is the duty of the people to support his majesty against the undue and improper influence of the nobles, and to express unanimously and publicly this their determination.—Whether the Convention of Cintra is one of those occurrences which precludes the necessity of publicly addressing his majesty, I leave you to determine; but certain I am, that it is

the true interest of his majesty, and of his majesty's people to endeavour to prevent a repetition of the alarming, dreadful, and disgraceful disasters, which have so frequently occurred with respect to the military expeditions of this country: this can only be accomplished, by a discovery of the causes which have produced such fatal effects.—It is neither my intention to inflame your passions by eloquence, nor to sway your judgment by argument; but I shall take the liberty of stating a few memorable facts for your consideration. Previous to the battle of Minden, British soldiers were invariably successful in the field; the victories obtained by British armies in those days, were victories; expedition was then expedition; and merit at that time was merit. Since that period you cannot be ignorant, that victory has frequently assumed the disguise of defeat; that expedition has become a mere creeping thing; and that merit is now understood to mean, rank, fortune, and influence. Do not imagine, my countrymen, that I consider the result of Lord George Sackville's trial the (sole) cause of these extraordinary "occurrences;" indeed I really do not: at the same time I must state, that had the people of England, during the progress of Lord G. S.'s trial been animated with the same laudable feeling with which they are now animated—or had the members of that court martial been such men as I could have wished,—I am perfectly convinced, that the frequent repetitions of similar misfortunes would not have disgraced the pages of British history. I shall not affirm that Lord G. S. escaped just and salutary punishment, because the truth is, that at this moment, I am not qualified to decide whether disgrace is, or is not, a punishment: however, for the purpose of forming a just conclusion on this subject, I am now studying moral philosophy, and should I find it proved to my satisfaction—that men who deserve extreme punishment, are capable of feeling disgrace as the greatest of "all possible punishments," I shall immediately communicate the important discovery to his majesty's attorney general, who will without doubt recommend it to the consideration of the judges at the Old Bailey. I have long been of opinion, that disgrace to an innocent, to an honourable man, is the greatest evil which can possibly befall him; and I am confirmed in this opinion, by the demonstration of an eminent moral philosopher, who also assures me, that what is an evil to the innocent, is not always a punishment to the guilty. However this may be, I shall not at present hazard any remarks upon such a tender sub-

ject.—In thus addressing you, I am neither actuated by party motives, nor private feelings. I am by no means dissatisfied with his majesty's present ministers; on the contrary, when I consider the nominal opposition of their enemies, and the real opposition of their friends, I am compelled to applaud their conduct, and on the whole, from my own knowledge of the vast abilities of some British generals, their secretaries, commissaries, &c. &c. I heartily acquit ministers of all charges which have been urged against them, with respect to the late dismal and unfortunate Convention. I now implore you, oh! my countrymen! no longer to remain silent, and passive spectators of events which involve the dearest interests of your country; but to make known, in a respectful manner, to a justly beloved sovereign, the disappointed hopes of a loyal people.—&c. JNO. HOMESPUN.

DEFENCE OF THE CONVENTION.

SIR,—The penetrating genius of Hudibras discovered that one spur was sufficient to make both sides of a horse go; wisely reasoning, that while one side of the animal was in action, the other could not be at rest.—You appear to have also made a discovery, though not equal to Hudibras'; his reasoning was incontrovertible; yours will only convince those who conclude without investigation; and who will consequently readily believe, that you would not devote a dozen lines of your Register of the 15th inst. to explain what you intended by the expression "next arrival," unless your meaning had been misrepresented; that you would not contend, unless opposed; appeal, unless resisted; or triumph, unless victorious. But, it is impossible to repel where no attack is made, and ridiculous to attack where no vulnerable point presents itself; and I felt perfectly satisfied that it was impossible to extract from my letter to you of the 30th ult. any one sentence from which, when properly considered with its context, you, possessing no moderate share of ingenuity, could make it appear, that the fair and natural inference coincided with what, in your explanation, you state you never intended. My meaning evidently was, that "the public could not reasonably expect that an unconditional surrender of the French forces in Portugal would be the immediate consequence of their defeat at Roleia and Vimiera," that "the defeats sustained by the French on the 17th and 21st Sept. did not materially increase the probability of eventually expelling them from Portugal more speedily, or on terms more advantageous,

than they would have been expelled by the English army, had no victory been obtained."—I stated my reasons for so thinking, and the fallacy of them has not been established. The question then was, considering the relative situation of the armies, according to the information of which the public was possessed at the time of the publication of the Gazette, announcing the victory at Vimiera, whether terms might not be granted, which would be preferable either to consuming time, and encountering the difficulties that must necessarily be experienced in blockading them, or to sustaining a great loss in forcibly expelling them from their forts and entrenchments. Indeed, so clear and obvious was my meaning, that I concluded no *Englishman* could be found so perversely stupid, as not to comprehend it; and under the influence of this conviction, added to the expectation I entertained, that, on the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple, some additional particulars would be communicated to the public, I determined neither to reply to your explanation, nor to the other observations which you made upon what I advanced. In both instances I have been disappointed; and shall therefore now shortly reply to those observations, and assure you, that, as you are well acquainted with mankind, I now begin to incline to the opinion, that you thought there might be some for whose benefit it was necessary to elucidate what was not ambiguous, and expound what was not mysterious.

And now this fustian stuff is done,
Let's fairly to th' argument come.

You ask was *it* a reasonable expectation? First: If you mean by *it*, "was the victory at Vimiera such as to render reasonable the expectation generally entertained that an unconditional surrender would be the immediate result?" I answer, no; and from the general tendency of your observations in the Register, I should conclude that you are a convert to this negation, were it not impossible to deduce this inference from your statement, that the whole of Junot's force (14,000) was repulsed by part (9,000) of Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, amounting to 18,000. Now, Sir, this is a phenomenon (if you please) in military affairs, for the existence of which a skilful tactician, even supposing the bravery of the contending armies to be equal, would experience no difficulty to account. But neither does necessity urge, nor inclination prompt me, to detail the demonstrations of theory, or crowd your pages with mili-

tary axioms. It is with peculiar satisfaction I admit, that the superior bravery and firmness of our troops repulsed the attacks of superior numbers of the French. But was their ability to do so first discovered at Vimiera? No. Fortunately many instances have occurred, in which the intrepidity and resolution of English troops have rendered abortive the impetuous and vigorous attacks of the French. They have resisted, where cautious prudence would dictate retreat, or advise surrender; they have assailed, where cold calculation would predict defeat, or foretel destruction. The people of England well knew the character of their soldiers; the retrospective view of their exploits was cheering and delightful; but what reason was there to suppose that they had degenerated? Was the spirit and courage, displayed by our soldiers at Malplaquet, at the commencement of the eighteenth century, less apparent at the attack at Lincelles and other places, at its close? Was the glory acquired at Minden obliterated at Maida? We were covered *with glory* at Vimiera—but obtained little else. The battle of Alexandria was gained by our troops, in nearly the same proportion to the French, as the battle of Vimiera. The retreat of the French in both cases was not prevented. Was the unconditional surrender of Abdallah Menou's troops the immediate and necessary consequence? Was it the eventual consequence after Sir David Baird had joined with the Indian army, and General Belliard had surrendered at Cairo, to the particulars of which surrender, and the circumstances under which it was negotiated, I beg leave to refer you? To return, however; was it the immediate and necessary consequence? No, and the only possible reply is, that after the battle of Alexandria the English army received no reinforcements; after the battle of Vimiera it did. This reply concedes the point, that, with the troops Sir Arthur Wellesley had at the battle of the 21st, it was not reasonable to expect an unconditional surrender. We have now to examine, with the augmentation of force on the part of the English, the relative situation of the two armies, which naturally includes the consideration of what you may, secondly, mean by the term *it*, viz. was the position of Junot so strong, his supply of provisions so ample, and his force so formidable, as to prevent the English army compelling him, without great delay or considerable loss, unconditionally to surrender? I refer to my former letter to you to shew, that, with the information the public then had, it was not rea-

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sonable to expect it, and shall now offer such observations as your remarks on that letter seem to require. It is necessary to premise, that it was generally known that 30,000 men had sailed for Portugal, yet till the news of the victory at Vimiera arrived, no sanguine expectations of unconditional surrender were entertained by the public; and that, at the time I wrote my former letter, no accounts had reached this country of the numbers for which transports had been demanded. I purposely admitted as correct the number which you acknowledged Junot had re-conducted into Lisbon; I stated the manner in which I accounted for the number of men Junot could collect; it was what no one could misunderstand or deny; and I still continue to believe that Junot had 20,000 men on whose active services he could rely. You do not prove that there is even a strong probability of the contrary. I cannot avoid expressing my surprise that you should so far have misunderstood as to misrepresent what I stated with respect to the advantage to be derived from a superiority of numbers in a blockade. I started no difficulties, but even granted, that *immediately* after the battle of Vimiera, "the English army was enabled to blockade him, and prevent his incursions into the country; Junot could not again meet them in the field." Further comment is unnecessary. I shall now consider what you advance respecting the advantage to be derived from a superiority of numbers in a storm, reminding you that I then said: "I do not mean to insinuate that our troops could not reduce Junot, but their amounting to 30,000 men would not prevent a great effusion of blood." Estimating, then, the actual military force of Junot at only 20,000 men, and increasing the 30,000 English troops in the proportion of 14 to 9, the ratio established at Vimiera, and which is conceding to you every advantage you can possibly expect from your argument, we shall gain an additional force of 17,000 imaginary men, phantasmagoria soldiers, Philipstal hussars, phantoms who would have been a *long time* in clearing redoubts, ramparts, counterscarps, &c. and have done *little* to enable our 30,000 substantial English soldiers to possess themselves of Junot's intrenchments. ["*Risum teneatis, amici?*"] It is important however to be serious in considering a serious subject. Let us give form and substance to airy nothing. Let us suppose that 30,000 English soldiers contain materials sufficient for the manufacture of 50,000 Frenchmen: here, then, 20,000 Frenchmen in intrenchments have to resist the attack of 50,000 Frenchmen.

I admit that this superiority for insuring success in storming is advantageous; but I repeat, that it would not prevent, on the part of the assailants a great effusion of blood. I suppose success, and shall therefore not allude to instances in which the assailants were defeated. When the Austrians, under Daun and Nadast, attacked the Duke of Bevern, commanding an army of 25,000 men in entrenchments before Breslaw, their loss nearly equalled the whole of Bevern's army, although they attacked him with a force nearly four times as numerous. The Austrians were astonished at their success, and the duke of Bevern was censured for returning with a comparatively trifling loss. Did the superior numbers of the French at Lodi prevent on their part a great effusion of blood? Did Mollendorf—but you must already be exclaiming:

Unitur in re non dubiâ testibus non necessariis.

Further, it is notorious that many instances may be cited to prove, that, after great loss has been sustained in storming the intrenchments and outworks, the assailants have granted to the besieged in the citadel terms of capitulation which secured to them very considerable advantages to small bodies of men shut up in forts not more formidable than those of Portugal, the greater part of which you say, if *your information is correct*, were things to be taken by storm with *perhaps* the loss of a thousand men for each attack.—Bravo! Mr Cobbett! Excellent well! Let the public read this, and every cool reflecting man will be vexed that he has suffered his feelings to get the better of his judgment, that he anticipated what was either impossible or what policy could not justify. I have a strong suspicion, that, with all your pretended contempt for the learned languages, you are well acquainted with the classics, and that, in writing the preceding sentence, you had in view the following passage of Cicero de Oratore: "*Si quæ premat res vehementius, ita cedere solere, ut non modo non abjecto, sed ne rejecto quidem sento fugere videar; sed adhibere quandam in dicendo speciem atque pompam et pugnae similem fugam.*" The application is not difficult; and I proceed to reply to what you advance respecting the successful defence of Saragossa and Valencia. You say it has not been owing to the strength of the *place*, but to the strength and courage of the defenders. I thought I had provided against an answer of this sort by instancing the defeat of the defeat of the Spaniards at Rio Seco by a third of their number; and it so happened, that the undisciplined defenders of these places were vanquished in the field, com-

pelled to retreat to their towns, and there became victors. And we now learn that these brave Spaniards hesitate, perhaps prudently, to attack Marshal Ney's corps on the Ebro. Although according to the accounts given in the newspapers, their army is three times as numerous as the French, and possesses besides a large proportion of regulars. As an answer to your representation of what I said with respect to distressing the inhabitants of Lisbon, I shall state what I did say: "there was no great reason to believe that a French army would starve, while there were between 2 and 300,000 Portuguese inhabitants in Lisbon; people whom we went to assist not to distress, to defend and not to assail;" and if Junot was to be reduced by blockade, the inhabitants of Lisbon would first suffer by want of provisions, whatever number of gibbets Dalrymple might erect round Junot's camp. Is it even a very great infraction of the laws of war for a general to subsist his army at the expence of the inhabitants who are his enemies? I beg leave to remind you of the manner in which you have treated this subject in some of your former Registers. In order, however, to remove every pretext for cavil, I will suppose myself to have said, that in the event of assault, every ball the English fired would kill more Portuguese than French; and that Junot would not have been restrained by the feelings of humanity from practising any species of torture and cruelty on the inhabitants, friends or foes, in order more successfully to resist the attack of the English.—You say that for our general to refrain from attacking them on that account is the determination of a coward. "What! did not Junot well know, that at last he must become really responsible for all the cruelties he committed upon the people of Lisbon?" Is Duhesme restrained through fear of the consequences from distressing the inhabitants of Barcelona? And did not the celebrated Earl of Peterborough and sir Cloudesley Shovel hesitate to attack this Barcelona, the inhabitants being in the interest of Charles, and not daring to lift a hostile finger, because, as they affirmed, they were overawed by the duke de Popoli's garrison of 5000 men? Was general Schmettau to be intimidated by threats from burning the fine suburbs of Dresden, and otherwise distressing its inhabitants, when Marshal Daun appeared before it with the whole of his army after his victory at Hoehkirchen? And was Daun considered a coward, for not attacking, with very superior numbers, the Prussian army in and before Dresden? No; and it was the threat to destroy the place, and partial

execution of that threat, that induced Daun not to ruin his friends equally with his foes, and save the Prussian army. Did the terror of Russian sabres and halberds induce the French to desist from firing from the citadel of Turin, on its inhabitants in the interest of the allies, who had driven them from their outworks, and got possession of the town? Was *hanging* mentioned in any article of the convention concluded there? It is indeed superfluous to relate any of the atrocities of which the French have been guilty: for no man will believe that they are to be deterred by a gibbet from committing any cruelty, if thereby they can secure to themselves any advantage. And the murdering of a few thousand Frenchmen in cold blood, would not much alleviate the sufferings of the inhabitants. It is however incontrovertible, that whatever portion of distress it is possible for an army to avert from friendly inhabitants, is a circumstance, in that degree at least, exculpatory of the commander, in not resorting to those measures which would have produced that distress. It is not alone, perhaps, sufficient to justify the total abandonment of an object, in itself highly important to be gained, (to shew which I have before stated the conduct of the great Earl of Peterborough at Barcelona), but it is a very considerable item in the catalogue of these obstacles, that collectively would wisely determine a commander to relinquish that object. I wish it to have its due weight and no more. I have now answered all your observations, and will again ask you candidly to declare, whether it was reasonable to expect an unconditional surrender of the French in Portugal, as the consequence of the battle of Vimiera; knowing that Junot was enabled to retreat to his position? If we had gained no victory, we must have occupied the same ground, and possessed nearly the same advantages. We gained glory, and little more; and this glory so dazzled our countrymen, that they considered as inevitable, what before they had deemed scarcely possible. It was this victory at Vimiera that made them exclaim:

Occidit, occidit,
Spes omnis et fortuna nostri nominis.

The public knew the amount of the force sent against Lisbon; and I ask, whether, (without recapitulating all the particulars) the relative situation of the armies, agreeably to the information the public then had and since confirmed, was such as to render unpardonable the granting of terms to the French? I think I have advanced reasons sufficient to prove the contrary. If they are futile, let their futility be proved; if they

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are convincing, let it be candidly avowed. If their fallacy shall be established, I shall not be ashamed to acknowledge my error; and I can assure you, I never hold the candid in contempt. Truth and impartiality are my objects; they were, I suppose, yours, when you nobly advocated the cause of Lutz, and firmly supported the effects of popular indignation at the peace of Amiens. Do not suffer yourself now to be biassed by popular clamour; whatever part of it arises from erroneous opinions, resist and correct as far as you can; whatever part of it is just and reasonable, sanction and support; but, let your determination be the result of inquiry; and do not let it be asked,

—Cur non

Ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur; ac res
Ut quæque est, ita supplicis delicta coercet?

The case seems to be this: the total expulsion of the French from Portugal is the grand object for which an English army is sent there; the difficulties in accomplishing this object are great, if the enemy determines to risk his own ruin in opposing them; but, so important is the object, they must be encountered. If however it can be obtained by granting terms to this enemy, which terms, on balancing the advantage derived, and the injury sustained, both in present effect and probable consequence, will secure *only* the same benefit that would have resulted from adopting the severe alternative of force, it is not culpable to grant them; and, in whatever degree the disadvantages resulting from such a Convention can be proved to exceed the benefits derived, in that degree the commander who signs it is culpable; and, I am sorry to say, there are some articles in it so mortifying and degrading, that I cannot conceive it will be possible to produce satisfactory reasons for having acceded to them. There is a portion of infamy attached to this Convention of Lisbon which I fear can never be wholly effaced. Grief and disgrace have invaded us, and I cannot yet discover how they are to be altogether expelled.—I have the honour to remain, with great respect, &c.—C.—25th October, 1808.

THE LATE HARVEST.

SIR;—As you are always watchful to direct the public attention to important topics, the intrinsic interest of a subject will be a sufficient claim to your notice though it should not obtrude itself by the popular clamour of the moment. The state of our Stocks of Grain, the prospects of our growing crop, and the probability of foreign supplies, were matters of inquiry and examination in

your Register pending the Distillery Bill. It appeared to you, because much had been said both in the house and out of it, that the subject had been completely exhausted; but, in the different views which were exhibited, the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of our present situation appears to have been overlooked. This, in fact, consists in that very extraordinary extension of the consumption of wheat in this country which of late years has so greatly outstripped the growth of the other countries of production. It is not that our own growth has not increased in a ratio proportioned to this extended consumption that we have cause of alarm, for the reverse is notoriously the case. In a work recently published, entitled "An Inquiry into the State of National Subsistence as connected with the Progress of Wealth and Population, by W. T. Combe," an historical view is exhibited of the progress of this increase, and it is there shown that the growth of wheat has doubled itself within the present reign, and, from evidence equally unquestionable, he has shown, that the increased production of other countries has borne no proportion to this amount. However adequate, therefore, our usual and ordinary growth may be to the support of our population, yet, in case of a failure, we can nowhere look for a stock adequate to supply our wants; for the redundant produce of other countries, which might supply a deficiency in a growth of four million quarters of wheat annually, would be utterly inadequate to cover a proportionate failure where the usual growth exceeded eight millions.—We must therefore admit the justness of the remark of the author above alluded to (p. 18, 8vo. edition), that "when the consumption of a country greatly exceeds the general produce of the neighbouring countries of exportation, it is from her own produce alone that a stock can be formed at all adequate to her probable wants on a failure of her own growth. The surplus produce of the whole world," it is added, "would afford small relief to such a population as that of China."—Without following this writer, who seems to speak from a practical acquaintance with the subject, through all the causes connected as they are with the existing corn laws, and the peculiar situation of the country which have prevented the formation of such stores, it must be acknowledged, that the removal of these difficulties becomes, under the present circumstances of the country, a matter of very urgent necessity. The practicability of encouraging such stores, without checking the operation of the dealers and farmers, is

demonstrated, and it certainly becomes the imperious duty of the legislature, from the peculiar fickleness of our climate, which, "owing either to our insular situation, or northern latitude, or both, combined with the comparatively limited extent of territory, has been a source of scarcity and famine in every period of our history," to turn their attention to this subject.—Nothing but that natural propensity in man, to forget past evils in the possession of present good, could prevent the effect which these repeated lessons ought to produce on our conduct. But we seem to be governed by a blind fatality or a desperate confidence. The harvest is now over, and the universality of the complaint of mildew puts it beyond a doubt that the injury is extensive. In some places the produce is estimated at a third less than the average crop, in others a fourth, and in some a fifth. If we could suppose the deficiency on the whole to be an eighth, this would amount to at least a million quarters of wheat, more than double our average importation, and which has never been exceeded but once in the annals of our history, and that after two successive failures.—The price of wheat has already risen at least 25 per cent, or a full fourth higher than they were before the harvest, and had it not been for the uncertainty of the American embargo, there can be little doubt that this rise would have been more considerable. "It is not the magnitude of our foreign supplies, so much as the manner of their coming into our markets, which affects our price." A hundred thousand quarters of wheat are not more than an eightieth part of our annual consumption; but such a supply arriving suddenly from America either in London or Liverpool, or both places, would depress the price very considerably, and affect those of the whole kingdom. This circumstance renders the holding of stocks extremely dangerous, without some sort of encouragement from government, and consequently lays us open to every casualty. This rise is already felt by many of the manufacturers both in Yorkshire and Lancashire, where a partial stagnation of trade exists, notwithstanding the new channels that have been opened to us. We must hope, however, that the words of the writer before alluded to may not prove prophetic: "The least consequence that would attend even an inconsiderable deficiency, in the total absence of all measures of precaution and prevention, and the almost inevitable exhaustion of the stocks, which would be a consequence of such neglect, would be a considerable distress to almost every rank and a most serious

alarm to the whole nation. If the failure was at all general or considerable, the consequence might be an abandonment of national interests, and a sacrifice of national honour, to obtain a participation in stocks, the amount of which, at least, probably, would afford us a very inconsiderable relief."—I remain, Sir, &c.—COLUMELLA.

BREWERIES.

SIR,—Persuading myself that a communication, which may contribute to remove error of any sort, will be favourably received by you, I am induced to offer the following observations on a subject of general concern, inasmuch as it relates to the purity, and other good qualities, of the national beverage, Beer.—What I am desirous to impress on the minds of the community is, that the production of *uniformly* good beer is not an arbitrary matter, as is commonly supposed, and which may be accomplished by any and every person who chooses to take on himself the office of a brewer. For, a man may be willing to sacrifice a large allowance of the choicest materials, without having the power, after all, to make a palatable, early, and spontaneously fine, and consequently a *wholesome* malt liquor, unless he is provided with, and fully understands *all* the uses of, some far more secure guides than the discriminations of his own senses alone will prove. A studious observation of the powerfully different effects of the different degrees of heat in the water used in the several extractions, and of the heat in fermenting the worts so extracted from the malt, is of the very first importance and necessity.—The last is an operation of such influence in the case, that, in conjunction with the precautions required to be observed in the mashings, fermentation determines the early or the later period of *natural* fineness, as well as a distinction of flavour according to the several stages of its progress, and, withal, fixes the principles of preservation in beers. Hops afford the basis of this last mentioned and desirable property; but all the benefits of the hops are destroyed by a few hours only of too long protracted, or otherwise erroneous, fermentation.—The several degrees of heat, critically suitable to these two leading parts of the process, rest on the brewer's experience and judgment; and, when discovered and determined on by him, are applied, most precisely, by the use of properly constructed thermometers. But these heats cannot be judged of, to any tolerably sufficient degree of correctness, by the perceptions of

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the touch alone. Neither is the exact quantity of saccharine matter, afforded by the malt, which is the foundation of all the strength in the beer, to be discriminated by the taste. It is, however, necessary that the precise amount of such *sweet* should be constantly ascertained; because, without a knowledge of this product, (which varies surprisingly according to the different quality of the barley, and the method of malting it) the brewer cannot maintain that *uniformity* in the strength and flavour of his beer, which is the only true criterion of a well regulated practice.—This valuable information is afforded by a suitable hydros-tatical instrument; which shews, by the specific gravity of small portions or samples of the different worts, and by their several gauged quantities, the total amount of such saccharine or fermentable matter contained in each brewing of malt, to a thousandth part, or less.—It will be evident to every reflecting mind, that, without a knowledge of the uses of these two instruments, so often as a practitioner succeeds in producing good beer, he is indebted to chance alone—and that he retains no *sure* means to repeat his fortunate operation. Time, indeed, will produce much change and, generally, some improvement in beers brewed at such random; a remedy which may be afforded, and is, also, greatly relied on in family brewings. But this cannot be otherwise than highly disadvantageous to the public brewers in the present state of their trade, by causing a necessity for a burdensome stock of beer, prepared from barley at an excessive price, and loaded with enormous duties on the beer, and on the malt.—The employment of the two instruments is now become pretty general in the trade; yet the advantages derived from them are but partial—always varying with the degree of experience and judgment possessed by the different practitioners, in establishing a set of rules for conducting the operations. It is, therefore, severely injurious that, owing to the generally prevailing opinion, that the business of brewing is merely practical, and therefore performable by persons of the meanest education, those, who have been somewhat more successful than some others, in discovering the beneficial points and use of the instruments, have become the objects of misrepresentation and detraction; and this, directly through the ignorance of the uninstructed part of the trade, or of other persons who are equally unin-

formed in the matter. Much calumny has been disseminated in a charge of their using other articles than “malt, hops, yeast, and water,” or it is chiefly pointed at a supposed use of substitutes for the two first. I shall endeavour to shew that the brewer who expends his money in any such substitutes, or in any extraneous matters whatsoever is most despicably ignorant of every advantageous principle of his business, and of his immediate interest in a pecuniary point of view; for that malt and hops, are not only the most *beneficial*, in every respect, but, also, the *cheapest* articles that can be used in a brewery.—It is well known to the Distillers, as well as to the intelligent among the Brewers, that it would be no more futile to attempt to make saleable bread from *stew-dust*, than to make any sort of vinous liquor (such as beer) from any matters whatsoever, except from some matter which is saccharine. For, no other subjects will yield an extract which is capable of the vinous fermentation; without *such* fermentation no strength or spirituousity can be produced; and the quantity of ardent spirit, (provided the fermentation has been properly conducted) is *ever* in proportion to the quantity of *sweet* contained originally in, and therefore extractable from, the subject or matter employed; and so very exact is this proportion of the spirit to the sweet, that the distillers can ascertain, to mathematical certainty, the precise number of gallons of proof spirit which will be yielded by their fermented liquor, (called by them *wash*) previously to committing the latter to the still. The same rule extends also to, and is practicable in, the brewery. Of all the saccharine matters whether domestic or foreign, procurable in this kingdom, the three cheapest, comparing the produce with the cost, are malt, treacle, and sugar. The proportions which these bear to each other, are, as 8 bushels of malt, so are 196 lbs. of sugar, or 240 lbs. of treacle.—The introduction of the smallest quantity of either of the last two, subjects the common brewer, by the excise laws, to the penalty of £200. If then it were even desirable to substitute such sweets for malt, could, let me ask, any useful quantity of such bulky matters be introduced into any considerable brewery, without the knowledge of every individual employed on the premises, who, as informers, would partake of the penalty? Would, therefore, any prudent man render himself liable to such mean tyranny, or to such exposure

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and such penalty? With regard to treacle, most not every person, however unacquainted with the practice of brewing, perceive, that a very small portion of this coarse and black article could not fail to destroy the sale of all beer required to be *pale*; and, as to sugar, the cost of 196 lbs. is 107s. while a quarter of the very best pale malt is to be made or purchased at 20 per cent. less; even under the present unusually high price of barley. Which, therefore, of all the saccharine matters, is the most desirable one to a brewer, in producing the most saleable beer, at the least cost to himself?—The use of hops in brewing, exclusively of their desirable flavour, is to preserve the worts from becoming acid; as they would, without this preventive, at some seasons, even in the first stage of the fermentation. For, the introduction or the omission of this ingredient constitutes the chief difference between the operations of making beer and vinegar from malt. More powerful bitters than hops, may perhaps, be procured, but the bitter is of no use without the preservative property. Gentian and quassia are wholesome and useful, as *medicines*; but, if introduced in beer, they cannot fail to cause a rapid decrease in the brewer's trade; owing to their total want of the fine aromatic flavour, as well as of the preservative qualities discovered, hitherto, in hops alone. Hence there can be no inducement to an understanding brewer to use any substitute whatsoever for hops; since it must be plain to every one, that a prosperous trade is no otherwise to be gained, or to be preserved, than by pleasing the palates of the consumers; and no other matters will afford so *saleable* a flavour in beer, as choice hops united with well made malt.—But, the most important of all the considerations connected with the case, relates to the wholesomeness, or otherwise, of the different malt liquors, brewed in the kingdom.—It is owing to the general ignorance among the majority of practitioners that scarcely any beers which are brewed by them will become naturally fine in less time than twelve months; when, they are, most commonly, hard, perhaps crabbed, and are, accordingly, deemed by all the medical men unwholesome. On the other hand, that species of malt liquor is allowed, and found to be the most wholesome, which becomes spontaneously bright at an early period, and will so continue, without tendency to acidity during as many months as may be required for consuming it. These desirable properties are to be obtained, constantly, only by a knowledge of the

proper heats which are suited to the critical parts of the process. While uniformity in strength, proportionate to the price obtained for the beer, is gained by the right use of an hydrostatical instrument. It will, probably, be remarked, that the well known importations at the custom-houses of certain articles, supposed to be used in the brewery, establish the proof that such matters are used in beers. It may be so. I am not attempting, nor am I at all desirous, to defend the practices of the grossly ignorant. What I affirm is, that no truly intelligent brewer would so waste his money to no other object than to deteriorate his beer, and thereby impede the sale of it.—In situations where public breweries abound, it is little imagined how very scarce they are in other parts of the kingdom; insomuch that it was stated to a committee of the house of commons, about eighteen months ago, by Mr. Jackson, one of the commissioners of excise, that the number of common brewers amounted only to 1,400 while the *brewing publicans* were so numerous as 23,700!!—If the community could be prevailed on to believe, that a generally successful practice in brewing is really and truly a matter of science, and not attainable without laborious study, and the constant assistance of accurately made instruments, which last can be of no use whatsoever, unless they are accompanied with some portion of mathematical knowledge, it would be evident that the greater bulk (if not all) of the 23,700, together with very many of the 1400, in the country, must be utterly incapable to apply the instruments, and to conduct such an intricate process, with any approach to certainty, and, that, unable to account for the disappointments which they *must* incur, wholly ignorant, also, of any correct means to judge of the comparative values of the *very best* materials for brewing, and the *very worst*, they are open to the insinuations of the vendors of the drugs alluded to, who, it is well known, hesitate at no falsehoods to persuade these uninformed people that the success of the reputable practitioners is owing to the use of the contemptible trash for which they pressingly solicit orders. These, therefore, if any, are the brewers who, through the grossest ignorance, become the purchasers of ingredients, utterly inapplicable to the purpose; and which can have no other effect than to increase their difficulties, as well as their expences.—On the other hand, the most wholesome, and generally preferable malt liquors, are chiefly to be expected from the efforts of men of better education, engaged in con-

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siderable breweries, wherein the principal himself, and not an ignorant deputy, directs the process. To such men the study of the practice affords a pleasing amusement, which leads them to ascertain the qualities of, and rightly to distinguish between, *the four only articles* which are useful and necessary, and all others which are *very far worse than useless*. Besides, it is not in the power of any brewer, however well experienced and instructed in the business, to obtain so large a proportion of vinous strength, as well as some other of the most desirable qualities in beer, from small as from larger brewings.—This is no chimera; for a powerful cause might be deduced from theory, if that were wanting, to explain the fact. This disadvantage, together with the general want of system among the inferior brewers, cannot fail to occasion the very serious waste of one fourth part of all the malt committed to their injudicious treatment. Any remarks on the effects of this *annual* loss, amounting, as might be shewn, to 400,000 quarters of barley, from the national stock of corn, would lead me farther than I intended; and would also intrude more on your valuable paper than I could expect will be allowed.—I am, very respectfully, Sir, yours, &c.
A HAMPSHIRE BREWER.—Nov. 4th, 1808.

CITY OF LONDON.

RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO THE KING'S ANSWER. (Concluded from page 736.)

He should not deny that we were at all times entitled to petition his majesty, and to state our grievances; but would any man contend, that his majesty had not an equal right to make what answer he thought proper to such Address or Petition? He threw out of his consideration the idea which some gentlemen seemed to entertain that in going up to the throne they were going up to the ministers. His view of the subject was very different. He conceived that the court had no right to know any thing farther of the Answer, than that it was the Answer of the sovereign, and in no other light were they entitled to regard it. It was on that understanding he supported the Address to its full extent; but he could never go the length of daring to dispute his majesty's right to answer it as he thought proper, however much he might lament the terms of such Answer.

Mr. Alderman COMBE expressed his astonishment at the doctrine he had just heard, so false, and so justly reprobated as it had always been held in the best times of the constitutional history of these kingdoms. The Answer of his majesty to an Address

was well known, and universally admitted to be the Answer of his ministers. His majesty's speech was uniformly received and discussed in parliament as the speech of his ministers; and it was admitted to be competent for every man, public and private, to discuss it as he pleased. He did not question the right of his majesty to return what answer he chose to such addresses as that court, or any other body, or number of individuals, might present to him. All he contended for was, the right of that court to state the sensation which they felt on receiving an answer such as the present to any Address which they might have presented to his majesty. The Address to which the Answer in question had been returned, was not to be treated as if it had been the Address of a faction, or of a short majority. It was the unanimous Address of that court, breathing a sentiment unanimously adopted through the country. The affront thrown on the court therefore, in the Answer which had been made to it, was uncalled for, and unnecessary. The motion now made did not bar or impeach the right of the crown to return any answer it thought proper. He hoped his hon. friend would follow it up with another Address, which should be again carried up to the throne, and which he should most cordially join in presenting.

Mr. Alderman BIRCH, referring to the words of the resolution, declaring that it was the right of the court to approach the throne "without obstruction or reproof," stated, that these were the words to which particularly, he objected.—Mr. CLARKE and another member submitted, that the use of the term "gracious Answer," when coupled with the resolution immediately following, would convey a contradiction in terms.

Mr. Deputy GOODBEHERE argued, that if ever there was a time when the rights and privileges of the City of London ought not to be compromised, this was the period. As the Court asserted their own privileges and independence, so would they be appreciated by the country at large. The Answer of his majesty he regarded as being highly injudicious, improper, and dangerous. When one and all ought to be united with one heart and one hand, as an independent nation, the City of London had been loaded with insult and degradation. This, he submitted, was a crime of the greatest magnitude, as being calculated in an eminent degree to produce anarchy and confusion. As well might gentlemen say, that the Corporation should at once surrender, or allow all their privileges to be snatched from them, as recommend it

to them to pass over the present Answer in silence. An extraordinary case required an extraordinary measure to meet it. Never had one occurred which could serve as a parallel to the case now before them; and that being so, he trusted the Court would see the necessity of adhering to their rights and privileges. This they would do, if they did not wish to degrade themselves, and to abandon the cause of the country.

Mr. GRIFFITHS contrasted the conduct pursued by ministers on the present occasion, and on the Address before last, which had been passed in that Court. Then it was signified to them that a full attendance would be expected, as it was his majesty's wish to see them all. Here, however, they could not be received in state. Ministers had advised his majesty otherwise. A worthy Alderman, who had always been extremely forward in going up with Addresses (Birch) had, too, been backward on this last occasion, and the Court had to wait half an hour before two Aldermen could be found to go up with the Address. The Answer, he conceived to be most ungracious.

Mr. WAITHMAN, in reply, declared, that of all the extraordinary doctrines which he had been accustomed to hear in that Court from the gentleman opposite (Dixon), and from a worthy alderman (Birch), nothing had ever surprised him so much as what he had heard this day. He had been informed by the worthy alderman that the Answer was to be held the Answer of the king, not of his ministers—of course, that no responsibility attached to ministers from any Answer which the king might make to an Address. The worthy commoner had denied all argument to his hon. friend. It might, therefore, have been expected that he himself would have used something like argument. But no—he, as usual, had the good sense not to get out of his depth, and had, of course, confined himself to abuse and despicable quibble. It would be necessary for him to bring to mind who was the person by whom, in 1800, a similar motion to that now proposed by him, was made. A petition was then presented to his majesty, requesting him to call parliament together, in consequence of a scarcity which then threatened the country. The Answer was cold; and alderman Hibbert, than whom a more worthy man never sat in that Court, thinking that it might have expressed some regret for the distresses of the people, along with the motion for entering the Answer on the Journals of the Court, moved words expressive of this feeling. This he thought was sufficient in answer to what had fallen from the worthy

gentleman (Mr. Dixon). As to any idea of abusing that worthy gentleman, he never carried his abuse beyond the public conduct of the person to whom he alluded; and if a man could not defend his public conduct, he must not expect to escape if he would obtrude himself on public notice. Praise the worthy gentleman for his political conduct, he could not do with any regard to truth. As to the worthy Alderman, for twelve years that he had observed him in this Court, he had never till this day observed him attempt any thing like a reply. He had now appeared in a new character; he had been unhappy in the exhibition, and he hoped he would never try it again. He seemed to be a pupil of sir R. Filmer, and, like many pupils, he had gone beyond his master, and had laid it down that a king might be and actually was his own minister. The great object of petitioning was, to take care that truth should reach the royal ear. The Common Council of London had, on this principle, gone up to his majesty and stated their wishes, and were they now, after having been reprovved for doing so, to stand still and not to tell his majesty that he had been badly counselled? The worthy Alderman might continue to boast of our glorious Constitution, and of our lords and commons; he might talk as he pleased of the dangers of popery, and of the blessings of our holy religion; but if we did not possess that privilege which the worthy alderman seemed inclined to deny us, we would soon cease to have any privilege whatever. Having contended, however, against this principle, the worthy alderman would, perhaps, have the goodness to tell what he thought the people of this country ought to do. Would he recommend to them to stand still, as the Spaniards had done, till things had come to such a crisis that they could only advise the king to run away? Were they the friends to the constitution, to the country, or to his majesty, who would give such an advice? Was it not this advice which had betrayed the Stuart family? Which had continued to deceive the king, till he was obliged to abdicate his throne, and which latterly produced the glorious Revolution, of which the right now contended for by him, but objected to by the worthy Alderman, was the corner stone and pillar? The fate of the country required this court to interfere, and apprise his majesty of the public wish. This was the very time to call on him to resort to better councils. The great sir W. Temple said, that great occasions wanted great men, and great men wanted great occasions.

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Never was this country in such a crisis as the present, or in one in which there was a greater want of great men. The question for the court, and for the country to consider, was, if they wished to become the mark for the slow moving finger of scorn to point at. It was impossible to feel on this subject like Englishmen, and not to feel degraded. Ministers were often obliged, by traps and tricks, to attempt to awaken the exertions of the state. In the present situation of things, however, there were not two opinions. The public was actuated as by one feeling. They had even thrust ministers forward in the contest. They had given liberally, they had given all that was demanded of them; and was it to be endured, after ministers had taken all that they could get, that we should have the mortification of seeing all ruined, either by their imbecility, or that of those appointed by them, and be denied even the consolation of expressing our grievances, and demanding inquiry into the causes by which our calamities have been occasioned? He hoped not only that the resolution now proposed would be carried, but that it would be carried unanimously. It did not seem possible that any man could oppose it, who was not a place-man or a place-hunter.

Mr. Dixon said, the worthy gentleman took pleasure in representing the country as ruined. He, on the other hand, declared it to be the admiration and wonder of the world. If the hon. gentleman's ideas of our kings were correct too, what would they be but puppets, ready to receive instructions? Though kings could do no wrong, he could not help recollecting, that their acts were sometimes visited on them. One had lost his throne, and another his life, for what the hon. gent. would call the work of their ministers.

The question on Mr. Dixon's Amendment, was now put and negatived, by a great majority. The original Resolution, moved by Mr. Waithman, was then put and carried, Alderman Birch and two or three commoners alone holding up their hands against it.

Mr. WAITHMAN said, the business would be incomplete if it were to rest here. He therefore moved, that an humble Address and Petition be presented to his majesty, in conformity to the said Resolution, expressing the desire of that court, that a strict and rigid inquiry should be made into the causes which led to the Convention in Portugal, as well as into the present system of our military preferments; and that his majesty would be graciously pleased to order his par-

liament to be forthwith assembled, for the purpose of considering of the most effectual means for carrying those desirable objects into execution.

Mr. Jacks, Mr. Clarke, and Mr. Deputy Box were of opinion, that the proposed Address should not be carried through but at a special meeting called for the purpose. It might otherwise seem that the court had been taken by surprise.—Mr. Dixon disapproved of an Address at all. His majesty had already assured the court, that an inquiry should be instituted. It would imply a doubt of the truth of his assurance, to repeat the application; and the request to convene parliament would go the length of inferring, that the court would not be satisfied even with a second declaration of his majesty's sincerity.—Mr. Alderman Combe objected to that part of the motion which extended to our military system. He doubted if the common council could be supposed sufficiently qualified to judge on that subject.—Mr. Waithman had no objection to omit that part of his motion.—Mr. Alderman Birch objected to the Address, particularly if to be conformable to the Resolution. He again alluded to the words "obstruction" and "reproof," and remarked that, though the court had indeed been reproofed, they could not complain of obstruction, they having been admitted to present their Address.—Mr. Waithman insisted on the propriety of seeing that his Majesty was not allowed to remain in ignorance of the opinion of that court; that his Majesty had been badly advised. He had no objection, however, as several gentlemen seemed to wish it, to withdraw his motion for the present.—It was then ordered, that the Resolution of the court, passed that day, be inserted in the usual morning and evening papers.

EXPOSITION OF THE PRACTICES AND MACHINATIONS WHICH LED TO THE USURPATION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, AND THE MEANS ADOPTED BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO CARRY IT INTO EXECUTION: BY DON PEDRO CEVALLOS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE AND DISPATCHES TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, FERDINAND VII. (Continued from p. 704.)

Without any other ground, your majesty thought proper to insult me in the presence of my venerable mother, and of the emperor, by appellations the most humiliating; and not content with this, you require my renunciation without any conditions or restrictions, under pain that I, and those who composed my council, should be treated as conspira-

tors In such a situation of things, I make the renunciation which your majesty commands, that you may return to the government of Spain, in the state in which you were on the 19th March, when your majesty made the spontaneous abdication of your crown in my favour.—May God preserve the valuable life of your majesty many years! which is the prayer of your loving and dutiful son, prostrate at your royal feet.—

FERDINAND — Bayonne, 6th May, 1808.

No. XI.—*Note of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. de Champagny, in reply to one from D. Pedro Cevallos, in which it is complained, that a Cabinet Courier dispatched by Order of Ferdinand the VIIth, with Documents for Madrid, had been detained, and in which he applied for Passports for another.*

The minister for foreign affairs has received the note which Signor de Cevallos did him the honour to address to him, complaining of the obstruction of the courier of his excellency. This measure was occasioned by a notification, that his imperial majesty had required, that no other king should be acknowledged than Charles the IVth. From this results, as a necessary consequence, that the emperor cannot admit in his territory any act in the nature of a passport given in the name of any other king, and for the same reason that the minister could not countersign the new passport which Signor Cevallos had sent him. But he hastens to apprise you, that all the letters which the courier conveyed, and which have been detained, have been put into the hands of the French postmaster, who will provide that they shall be sent to Burgos and Madrid with the greatest punctuality, and the same will be done as to all others, that the Spaniards, whether in France or Spain, choose to have conveyed, either by the ordinary post, or by a French courier. All will be transported to their respective destinations with the most scrupulous exactness, and the correspondence between the two states, far from experiencing any interruption, will acquire new activity.—M. de Champagny, in sending this note to Signor de Cevallos, has the honour to assure him of his high consideration.*— Bayonne, April 29, 1808.

* While the emperor intreated the king to renounce the throne in his favour, no difficulty was made in countersigning the passports that I gave in his royal name, but as soon as the French government saw its hopes disappointed, it refused passports to every dispatch.

No. XII.—*Resignation by Signor Don Pedro Cevallos of his Office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, into the Hands of Joseph Napoleon, on the 28th of July.*

Sir—At the time your majesty had the goodness to invite me to continue in the employment of minister for foreign affairs, I believed that I ought to submit to your notice some reflections, according to which your majesty could neither have the least confidence in me, or I the least security in your majesty's protection, since I found myself injured, and carefully watched by the emperor, your august brother, whose influence over your majesty's mind could be in no respect favourable to me.—Your majesty persisted in your resolution, telling me that you were anxious to have near you persons possessing the esteem of the nation; but I having no other wish than to return to my native land, which had been denied to me after two months' application to his imperial and royal majesty, it was necessary for me to accept the nomination of your majesty, to put an end to the lamentable separation from my family, and my fellow-countrymen, reserving always the right which no one can renounce, of adhering to the vote of the majority of the nation, in case it should not be disposed to acknowledge your majesty for their sovereign.—To your majesty I have since shown, that Spain is almost unanimously opposed to recognize you as king; and if this claim be wanting to you, there is no other by which your majesty can continue sovereign of these kingdoms. Thus circumstanced, I should be a traitor to my own principles, if I were to continue to exercise a ministerial capacity accepted under such circumstances, and not from a desire to have any influence in the government of your majesty, which I renounce from this moment, to go into retirement, where I will consecrate to my unhappy country my wishes and tears for its calamities and distresses, which I should be glad to remove, for the happiness of a nation noble, generous, loyal, and brave.

APPENDIX respecting the Manner in which the Grand Duke of Berg obtained by Surprise an Order from the Junta of Government to deliver over to him the Person of the Prisoner, Don Manuel Goztoy.

Ever since the grand duke of Berg, lieutenant-general of the armies of the emperor, set his foot on the territory of Spain, he endeavoured, by every possible artifice, to impress a general opinion, that he came for our happiness, and to effect certain useful reforms in our government; studiously giving out, that he would protect the cause

of the prince of Asturias, and that he would oppose the prince of Peace, who was the object of universal hatred with the nation. Neither did he neglect to give forth some hints of the great influence of the queen in public affairs. It was very well known, that this only was necessary to captivate the affections of the oppressed Spaniards; and since his mission had for its object what we have since seen, it must be acknowledged, that the calculations of the emperor of the French, his master, were well grounded.—As, however, all things in this world are subject to change, the ever-memorable movements at Aranjuez occurred, and subverted all this plan. Scarcely had the grand duke of Berg become acquainted with them, than he altered his scheme, and appeared to make a great interest in the fate of don Manuel Godoy, with whom he had held correspondence of the nearest intimacy, although he was not personally known to him. It was not concealed from his sagacity that the royal parents took great interest in the protection of their favourite. Then it was that he began to take the most efficacious measures to liberate Godoy from prison; but all this was ineffectual, as long as their beloved king, Ferdinand VII, remained at Madrid. The grand duke of Berg was not dismayed by this circumstance; but scarcely had his majesty arrived at Burgos, when he renewed his application to obtain what he long wished; threatening, in case a negative was given, that he would use the force at his disposal to effect his purpose.—The junta, nevertheless, resisted his first application, and consulted the king as to what they ought to do in such critical circumstances. His majesty was pleased to acquaint them with the answer he had given on the same subject to the emperor of the French, who had himself solicited the release of the prisoner; and which answer is as follows:—‘The grand duke of Berg and the ambassador of your imperial and royal majesty have, on different occasions, made verbal applications that don Manuel Godoy, prisoner for a crime against the state in the royal palace at Villaviciosa, should be put at the disposal of your majesty.—Nothing would be more agreeable personally to myself than to accede to your wishes, but the consequences would be so serious if I were to do so, that I think it right to submit them to the prudent consideration of your majesty.—Consistently with one of the duties of my situation, which is to administer justice to my people, I have ordered the most dignified of the tribunals of my kingdom to judge don Manuel Godoy according to the laws.

I have promised to my people that I would publish the result of a process on which depends the honour of a great number of my subjects, and the preservation of the rights of my crown. Throughout the whole extent of my dominions, there is not a single district, however small, which has not addressed complaints to the throne against that prisoner. All my subjects have signified their joy in a remarkable manner, from the moment that they were informed of the arrest of don Manuel Godoy, and all have their eyes fixed on the proceedings and decision of this cause.—Your majesty, a wise legislator and a great warrior, can easily determine the weight of these considerations; but if your majesty feel yourself interested in the life of D. Manuel Godoy, I give you my royal word, that if, after a full examination of his case, he should be condemned to death, I will remit that punishment, in consequence of the interposition of your imperial majesty.—May God preserve the life of your imperial majesty many years.—FERDINAND.—Vittoria, April 18, 1808.—The royal order of the same date also apprised the junta, that if the grand duke of Berg renewed his applications in favour of Godoy, he should be answered, that this business was in treaty between the two sovereigns, and that the result depended exclusively on the decision of the king. His majesty having been informed that his royal parents (ill informed, no doubt) had complained to the grand duke of the ill treatment of the prince of Peace in his prison, his majesty commanded me, notwithstanding his conviction of the delicate treatment observed by the Marquis of Castelar, that I should direct him, that the greatest care should be taken of the health of the prisoner, which I did under the same date.—Scarcely had the emperor received the letter of the king, when with his accustomed haughtiness he abused it, and wrote to the grand duke of Berg, telling him, that the prince of Asturias had put the prisoner, don Manuel Godoy, at his disposal, and commanding him vigorously to claim the surrender of his person. Nothing more was necessary for Murat, whose character is naturally daring and violent, and he sent the following note to the junta:—‘The emperor and king having informed his imperial and royal highness the grand duke of Berg, that his royal highness the prince of Asturias had just written to him, telling him that he referred the fate of the prince of Peace to his disposal; his highness in consequence directs me to inform the junta of the intentions of the emperor; on account of which I repeat the request for the delivery of

the person of the prince, that he may be sent into France.'—This determination of his royal highness the prince of Asturias, perhaps, has not yet reached the junta. In this case it appears that his royal highness must wait for the answer of his majesty the emperor; but the junta will see, that to answer the prince of Asturias will be to decide a different question, and it is known that his imperial majesty cannot recognise as king any other than Charles IV.—I beg the junta to take this note into their consideration, and to have the goodness to answer me on the subject, in order to give an explanation to his imperial highness the grand duke of their decision.—The government and the Spanish nation will see in this resolution of his imperial majesty, only a new proof of the interest he takes in Spain; because, in removing to a distance the prince of Peace, he wishes to deprive malevolence itself of the possible belief that king Charles will restore to power and to confidence one whom he has resigned for ever; and further, the junta of government certainly will do justice to the exalted sentiments of his majesty the emperor, who would not abandon his faithful ally.—I have the honour to offer to the junta the assurance of my high consideration.—The general in chief of the *etat major* general,—**AUGUSTO BELLIARD.**—Madrid, 20th April, 1808.—He added, verbally, to this note such atrocious and unheard-of threats, that the junta, no doubt fearful lest they should be realized, and that the tranquillity of Madrid would be shaken, had the weakness to accede to the proposition, and commanded the Marquis de Castelar, by order of the king, the same night, to deliver up the prisoner, which, in fact, was done with great repugnance on his part, and on the part of all the officers who had him in custody.—A proper regard to truth requires that it should be said, that don Francisco Gil, secretary of state and of marine affairs, and in consequence member of the junta of government, opposed the surrender of the prisoner, because it was not authorized by the king.—It is difficult to conceive how, after such direct acts as those that are stated, the junta of government should proceed to inform the council and the public, by the means of two extraordinary gazettes, that the prince of Peace had been delivered up by order of the king. The same difficulty occurs, how this junta could endeavour to excuse its weakness, by distorting expressions of the official correspondence; as for example, a passage in the dispatch addressed to the council, which this tribunal, in its manifest, folio 14 of the

quarto, cites in the following terms:—'As to what respects the prisoner don Manuel Godoy, the king commands me to inform the junta, in order that they may make the proper use of this notice, that his majesty esteems too highly the wish expressed by the emperor of the French, not to gratify it, extending at the same time generosity in favour of a criminal who had offended the royal person.'—With little reflection, it ought to have occurred to them, that this supposed order was not intended to give liberty to the prisoner, but that the king was disposed to extend generosity towards him out of respect to the emperor. In order to know what species of generosity this was, it was only necessary to recur to the decree which his majesty addressed to the council, and which it has inserted, folio 15 of the same edition. Under the same date of the 18th of April, a royal order was addressed to the Marquis de Castelar, notwithstanding his majesty's firm persuasion that his royal parents laboured under a mistake, directing that every care should be taken of the health of the prisoner; and if at the same time the king had commanded that the junta of government should have set him at liberty, such a precaution with regard to his health would have been idle and ridiculous. Besides this, when the junta of government gave an account to the king of the considerations and motives that they had for setting the prisoner at liberty, which are the same that have been stated, his majesty commanded me to reply in the following terms:—'The king is made acquainted with the motives the junta of government had for the delivery of the prisoner without his order.'—The two chief officers of the first secretary of state, and of the cabinet of his majesty, and his secretaries of decrees, don Eusebio de Bardaxi y Azara, and don Luis de Onis (through whose hands they were passed) certify this statement of the junta, and of the reply of the king.—I have considered it to be my duty to publish these transactions, that the whole nation may be informed of the circumstances which occasioned the surrender of don Michael Godoy, which is falsely attributed to his majesty, who never could think of abandoning the solemn promise he gave to his beloved people, to judge him according to the laws, and that we should on this account be more strongly confirmed in the ardent affection we cherish for our beloved king Ferdinand VII. whom God restore, as soon as possible, for the completion of our happiness.—We, don Eusebio Bardaxi y Azara, and don Luis de Onis, secretaries of decrees to our lord the king, and principal of

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officers of the first secretary of state, and of the cabinet, certify the fact of the representation of the junta of government, and the answer returned to it by the king; and that they were conceived in the terms stated by the most excellent signor don Pedro Cevallos, in his Expositions; the documents having passed through our hands, and which we authenticate by our signatures.—EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI Y AZARA.—LUIS DE ONIS.—Madrid, Sept. 3, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Manifesto of the Junta of Seville, Aug. 3. 1808. (Continued from p. 576):*

Various supreme juntas and military chiefs have expressed their conviction of this truth.—A conviction of the same springs from the indispensable necessity of a civil government in every nation whose duty is to attend to the happiness of the kingdom, and to which the military may be subordinate. The confidence of the nation, and, consequently, the public funds and the capitals of individuals, must, necessarily, have a civil government for their support. Without it, the military power would, indispensably, be under the necessity of employing violence, with the view of acquiring that confidence which it never could attain, and getting a command of those capitals, which it would be equally impossible for it to bring within its grasp; and thus it would ultimately destroy the public prosperity and happiness, which ought to be the sole object of every government. Let us not vainly flatter ourselves with notions of Roman dictators, and the other military chiefs of the ancient republics: they were placed under very prudent restraints, and the duration of their authority was limited to a very short period. The dangers of complete despotism and usurpation kept them in continual alarm, and compelled them to take very rigorous precautions, which are very incompatible with the habits of modern times. Spain has derived a lesson of wisdom from the history of past ages: she has never thought of appointing a military dictator. Her military chiefs (and it is a fact most honourable to the Spanish name) have been the first to embrace, with the utmost cordiality, a system of things as ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The experience of our times—the confidence of the people in the supreme juntas—the facility and abundance with which pecuniary resource have been placed at their disposal—the heroic loyalty with which the military chiefs and the army have acknowledged and obeyed them, and the hap-

py issue hitherto of their civil administration, and the military enterprises which they have directed, have placed in the most conspicuous light, and established beyond all doubt, this fundamental truth, and most essential political principle.—But who is to create this supreme civil government? Who are to compose it? Where shall be its place of residence? What the extent of its authority? How shall it be established without interrupting the public tranquillity, and producing disunion among the different provinces? How is the public opinion to be so regulated as that, without opposing it, this tranquillity shall be attained, and all risk of disturbance obviated? These are the important and serious questions which we shall now proceed to examine; and upon which, influenced solely by the love of our country, and our anxiety to promote its welfare, we will enter into a frank explanation of our sentiments.—In the various papers that have been published upon this subject, we are told that the cortes should assemble; that they should elect representatives; and farther, that the old council of Castile should convoke them, and the whole of the proceeding should be executed under its authority.—Most assuredly we do not understand the grounds upon which this decision rests. The council of Castile, though a lawful assembly, never convoked the cortes. Why, then, should we give it an authority which it does not possess? Is it because it lent the whole weight of its influence to such important changes, with regard to which it had no powers, nor any authority whatsoever? Is it because it has acted in opposition to those fundamental laws, which it was established to preserve and defend? Is it because it afforded every facility to the enemy to usurp the sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the crown and the dynasty legally in possession, and recognized and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of a shadow of a title to it; for it is incontrovertibly manifest, that the renunciation of Charles IV. in his favour gave him no such claim? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a government created by an authority invalid and illegal, and which had also rendered itself suspected, by the previous commission of acts of so horrible a description, that they may be justly ranked with the most atrocious crimes against the country?—The council of Castile being thus excluded from all consideration—who should convoke the cortes? The authority to convoke them is a part of the peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the king. The provinces would not submit to

any other authority; they would not unite; there would be no cortes; and should a few delegates assemble, that very circumstance would expose the kingdom to division—the evil which all wish to avoid.—Besides, the cities who have votes in the cortes have not undertaken the defence of the kingdom, nor of themselves, nor in their corporate capacity have they made any effort to defend it. We entertain the most profound respect both for them and their rights; but truth compels us to speak out.—Most undoubtedly, however, the cities who have votes in the cortes, in thus conducting themselves, acted with consummate prudence, and with a due observance of law. The kingdom found itself suddenly without a king and without a government—a situation indeed unknown in our history and to our laws. The people legally resumed the power of appointing a government; and this truth has been openly avowed by various supreme juntas. The people created these juntas without paying any regard to the cities who have votes in the cortes. The legitimate power is therefore deposited with the supreme juntas, and, in virtue of that power, they have governed and do govern with real authority, and have been and still are acknowledged and obeyed by all ranks of subjects, and by all cities in their respective districts, having votes in the cortes. Their situation has not changed; the danger still exists; no new authority has supervened; the lawful authority therefore resides entire in the juntas which the people created, and to which they confided it.—It is, therefore, incontestible that the supreme juntas have the sole and exclusive right of electing those who are to compose the supreme government, as the only means of protecting and preserving the kingdom, whose defence the people have entrusted to them, and which cannot be accomplished but by the establishment of a supreme government. Nothing is more evident than this truth.—And whom shall the supreme junta elect? Most certainly individuals of their own body; for they alone derive their power from the people, and it is in their constituent members that the people have reposed their entire confidence. Should any other persons be chosen, they would possess neither the confidence nor the consent of the people, and all their acts would be null and void; and from this want of confidence, the nation would be exposed to intestine divisions, the last and greatest of all our calamities.—Hence, if there be any province in which the military power has alone been retained, results the absolute necessity of constituting supreme juntas in which the power of the

people shall reside, and by which they may act. Whether they shall be constituted by the petty cortes or any other bodies, their appointment in some form or other is indispensable, in order to the concentration of the legitimate power of the people, and the establishment of a civil government, which shall inspire confidence into the people, and proceed to the choice of persons who shall compose the supreme government, which, under the present circumstances, cannot be legitimate, unless it has its origin in the free consent of the people.—It seems then to be indispensably necessary, that all the supreme juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect from among their own members two deputies to form the supreme government, and the persons so elected should, from that moment, be reputed, and actually be the governors-general of the kingdom; and that as such they should be universally acknowledged and obeyed.—Their authority is well known, and cannot be subject to any doubt. The supreme junta of Valencia has most judiciously marked its extent and limits, in the paper which they published on this question, on the 16th of July. We shall, therefore, be excused from going more at large into the consideration of it.—We will only add, that the supreme juntas ought to be continued with all their appointments and insignia, and be invested with the internal governments of their respective provinces, until the conclusion of the present state of things, but at the same time under due subordination to the supreme government. In those supreme juntas resides the legitimate power of those portions of the people who have respectively created them. It is their duty to take measures for insuring the happiness of their constituents, through the medium of a just government, and vigilantly to protect and defend the rights of every individual among them. For this purpose they ought to give their instructions to their respective deputies, constituting the supreme government; and it will be the duty of the latter to observe them, and to represent and support the claims of their provinces, as far as may be consistent with the general prosperity.—If there existed among us a royal personage, capable of presiding in this supreme government, reason and justice prescribe that he, and no other, should be appointed to that office. But if there be no such royal personage, the supreme government must elect a president from its own body. To obviate every danger, however, the presidency should be temporary, and continue only for a fortnight, a month, or

any other term agreeable to the supreme government; upon the lapse of which period it should be incumbent on them to choose a different person.—We have already remarked, and it is unnecessary to repeat it, that the supreme juntas should elect as deputies to the supreme government such of their members as are most distinguished for their talents, their general knowledge of legislation, and all the branches of public welfare and government, recollecting that they are to be the depositaries of the hopes of the kingdom. The supreme junta, in full reliance upon the generous character of Spaniards, and their ardent attachment to the good of their country, assures itself that intrigue, party, or personal interest or predilections, will have no influence upon this occasion.—The supreme juntas will, in the first instance, appoint the place, which shall be the seat of the supreme government, who shall afterwards adhere to or alter that appointment, as they think fit, according to a plurality of votes. The seat of government, as has been most wisely observed by the supreme junta of Valencia, ought to be at a distance from all the dangers of war, and should, as a claim to preference, possess other advantages of a local nature. Seville conceives herself to possess all these advantages but has no anxiety to be selected; for she will most cordially sacrifice all her claims to what the other supreme juntas shall decide to be for the general prosperity of the kingdom. The supreme juntas will, therefore, make known their pleasure as to this point, when they notify the election of their deputies. In the meantime we will frankly state that La Mancha appears to us most convenient for the seat of government, and there we would particularly name its large cities of Ciudad Real or Almagro. But on this subject we are nowise anxious; we leave it entirely to the free choice of the supreme juntas.—It remains only that we speak of this supreme junta of Seville, upon which point we shall not say much. Certain persons, either ignorant or malevolent, have endeavoured to spread the persuasion that we affected a superiority over the other provinces. Any such thought has been far from us, although the general good of the nation has been our guide, and as it were the soul of all our determinations. We possessed the only foundery for cannon in the kingdom, and arms and ammunition in a certain degree of abundance. Various captains general acknowledge us from the commencement, and veteran troops were more numerous in our province than in other parts; and thus we formed an army in a

shorter time, and have harassed the enemy, who have surrendered prisoners of war, with their general, Dupont, and have capitulated for the divisions of generals Vedel and Gobert, who are to be conducted to France, amounting, altogether, to 17,000 men, so that there does not remain a single French soldier in arms in the Andalusias; a victory most glorious and singular, which has been effected without the effusion of much Spanish blood, in which it appears we stand alone.—The local situation of the Andalusias presents also a more probable mode of defence against the arms of Napoleon, if he means to attack us; and, with this view, we have united with us the Portuguese provinces of Algarve and Alentexo, who have placed themselves under our protection; and the Canary Isles have sent us a deputy for the same purpose.—The greater opulence and other peculiar circumstances of these provinces offer resources which the rest want; and we have thus been enabled to make provision for immense expence, without having received any money from any other part, or imposed any contributions.—The marine arsenal of the isle of Leon, perhaps the most considerable of all, obeyed us from the beginning, and with it the Spanish squadron off Cadiz, whose force is the greatest, and has been since augmented by that of the French moored in that harbour, and surrendered to us at discretion.—Gibraltar, the famous English fortress, is in our territory, and one of the most numerous squadrons of that nation kept our coast in a state of blockade. We immediately, therefore, opened a communication with Gibraltar, and with the English squadron, which has given us all the assistance that was in its power, sent us a resident minister at the very first, and conveyed our deputies to London, to request subsidies, and settle a peace advantageous to the whole nation.—Amidst so many serious cares, we have transmitted all the arms which it was possible to transmit to Granada. Estremadura has received a still greater number, and has experienced our protection, and so has Cordova and Jaen. We have offered arms to La Mancha, to Murcia, to Tarragon, to Gerona, who requested them of us, and we exerted ourselves to the utmost to fulfil the promises which we had made.—We have not forgot the rest of the European provinces and kingdoms, and we hope in time that the effects of our zeal and vigilance will be made clear and public.—The Americas claimed at the first a great share of our attention, in order to preserve that so principal part of the Spanish monarchy. We have

sent envoys and commissaries thither and to Asia, in order that they may unite themselves to us, which we could not do without qualifying ourselves as the supreme junta for the government of Spain and the Indies, and we trust that this title and our cares will not be found useless. So many labours, surrounded by so many dangers, will, we trust, deserve some consideration of our country, for the love and defence of which only we have done and suffered so much.—With all this, we repeat that we neither affect nor desire any superiority. Whatever we have done, we owed to our country: it was an indispensable obligation upon us. Our only object is, that Spain may preserve its integrity and independence, for our lord and king, Ferdinand VII; and for that object we joyfully sacrifice our lives. May God, who has so clearly and marvellously shewn his protection of Spain, grant a safe return to its king Ferdinand VII! And then with the supreme government, he will determine what may be his royal will, either commanding an union of the cortes, or by such other means as his prudence may suggest, and will facilitate the reform of abuses and the general happiness of the kingdom, securing it upon such foundations as are firm, and subject to no change.—If these hopes are vain, in which the clemency of God leads us to indulge; then the existing supreme government will itself determine what is most conducive to the interest of the kingdom, conforming itself to the fundamental laws thereof, defending it against the fury and malice of our enemies, and preserving this monarchy, in which itself, the liberty of nations, and the Catholic church, the beloved spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ, is so deeply interested.—Given at the royal palace of Seville, this 3d day of August, 1808.—FRANCIS SAAVEDRA, Archbishop of Laodicea; the Dean of the Chapter of the Holy Church; FRANCIS XAVIER CIENFUEGOS; VINCENT HORE; FRANÇOIS DIAZ BERMUDO; MANUEL GIL, C. M.; Father JOSEPH RAMIREZ; JUAN FERNANDO AGUIRE; Count TILLY; Marquis de la GRANINA; Marquis de TORRES, and eleven others.

REVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL.—Proclamation by Lieutenant General Hope, commanding the Troops of his Britannic Majesty, for the immediate Security and Tranquillity of Lisbon.

Inhabitants of Lisbon;—Your country is rescued, and you are restored to freedom: your national flag is flying in every quarter of the kingdom, and his excellency the general-in-chief of the British

army is anxious to establish your civil government upon the same footing in which it was left by your beloved prince, when, assisted by the constant friends of his person and his throne, he escaped from his most insidious enemies. Without losing a moment, we are endeavouring to effect this measure, and to substitute a civil government to the military; to accomplish which, however, some days will be requisite. In order, then, that the evil disposed (if such there be) may not convert true liberty into unbridled licentiousness, and in order to avoid, in the present crisis, the terrible consequences of such disorder, it belongs to the commander-in-chief, and to those to whom he has immediately delegated the superintendence of the public tranquillity of this city, to watch with all vigilance over its peace and quiet, and to give security to the persons and property of its loyal and worthy inhabitants. To obtain this desirable end it will be necessary, for a short time, to maintain strong guards, piquets, and patrols, in various directions, in order to seize and take into custody every person who shall attempt to disturb the public peace.—You may rejoice, inhabitants of Lisbon! You have great cause for gladness; and your English friends, participating in your sentiments, rejoice equally with you. Never let it be permitted, however, that the evil disposed should thereby have an opportunity of promoting insurrection or confusion! But let them beware of such a design! The most vigorous and effective means are prepared for suppressing any attempt of this nature, and all who may be guilty shall be punished according to military law, in the most prompt, rigorous and exemplary manner; and for the purpose of removing every temptation to interrupt the peace of the city, I prohibit, under the present circumstances, the entering the city with arms, and the wearing them in the public streets. All inns and taverns, where wine or spirituous liquors are sold in small quantities, are, for the same reason, required to be shut up at six in the evening, and not to open before sun-rise, under the pain of imprisonment to the dealers, and forfeiture of their liquors.—Finally, I invite all persons, who possess any authority or influence whatever, and whether included or not in the body of the magistracy, and more particularly the holy ministers of religion, to assist the military power in preserving the tranquillity of the capital, until the much wished for object of seeing the constituted civil authorities in the exercise of their functions be obtained.—God save the Prince Regent! Viva! Viva!—J. HOPKINS, lieutenant-general.

Proclamation, by the British and French Commissioners, for seeing carried into Effect the Convention agreed upon between the respective Commanders-in-Chief. Dated Lisbon, 10th Sept. 1808.

For the fulfilment of the stipulation made in the Convention agreed upon for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army, that property of every kind confiscated, or seized, from the subjects, or other persons residing in Portugal, whether of the royal palace, royal and public libraries, and museums, and from individuals that are still existing in Portugal, should be restored:—We, the commissioners for seeing carried into execution the said treaty, as his excellency the commander of the French army has already notified to his army, think it also right to make public the same for the information of all concerned, and for facilitating the restitution, or the receiving back such property, we have judged expedient to appoint a committee of three persons, viz. lieutenant-colonel Trant, O. Sr. Antonio, Rodrigues de Oliviera, and Mr. Dubliur, commissaire des guerres, to meet at No. 8, Cargo de Loretto, who are appointed to receive, inquire into, and judge of all reclamations on this head, and whose orders for the restitution of property, to whomsoever addressed, are to be obeyed. And it is directed that keepers shall have charge of sequestrated or seized property in every house to which it may have been removed, to assure the conservation of objects or moveables transported from royal or public houses, or others, for the use or convenience of such general, administrator, or other subject of the French army. These keepers will make the description of all *meubles* with the name of the owners, and be accountable for whatever is therein, and they will be delivered only on legal proof of ownership, to the possessors of such articles as above described, who will transmit to this committee a return of what each may have in his possession of the property designated. And all persons may with safety apply to this tribunal.—We think it necessary also, to make known to whom it may concern, that any purchase made of articles taken from the public arsenals or stores since the 30th of August, or whatever shall on trial, be proved to have been illegally sold or disposed of at any time, even previous to the 30th August, shall be null and void, the articles seized and the persons purchasing subject to what the law may further direct.—The committee assembled to receive reclamations, and faci-

litate the restitution of property, hold its sittings at the house of Sr. Antonio Rodriguez de Oliviera, No. 8, Cargo de Loretto.—W. C. BERESFORD, Maj. General, PROBY, Lieutenant-Colonel, British commissioners.—Le Général KELLERMAN, Le commissaire Français pour l'exécution de la Convention, du 30 Août.

Address of the Officers of the British Army, to Sir Arthur Wellesley, on presenting him a Piece of Plate.—Camp at St. Antonio de Tugal, Sept. 6, 1808.

SIR;—The commanding officers of corps, and field officers, who have had the honour of serving in the army under your command, anxiously desirous of expressing the high opinion they entertain of the order, activity, and judgment, with which the whole of that force was so ably and successfully directed, from the time of landing, to the termination of your command in the action of Vimiera, request you will accept from them a piece of plate, as a testimony of that sincere esteem and respect which your talents and conduct have so justly inspired.—(Signed) W. W. Blake, major 20th light dragoons, Wm. Robe, lieutenant-colonel commanding royal artillery, James Viney, major royal artillery, H. Elphinstone, captain commanding royal engineers, Edward Gopson, major 5th regiment, and lieutenant-colonel Thomas Eames, major 5th regiment, Henry Bird, captain 5th regiment, and major, Thomas Carnu, major 6th regiment, Arthur Miller, major 6th regiment, J. Cameron, lieutenant-colonel commanding 1st bat. 9th foot, H. Craufurd, major 1st bat. 9th foot, and lieutenant-colonel, D. White, major, 29th regiment, foot, and lieutenant-colonel, G. Way, major 29th regiment, Thomas Egerton, captain 29th regiment, and major, Andrew Creagh, captain 29th regiment, and major, Samuel Hinde, lieutenant-colonel commanding 32d regiment, H. Johnson, major, 32d regiment, John Wood, majors 32d regiment, Robert Coote, captain 32d regiment, and major, Robert Burne, colonel commanding the 36th regiment, Lewis Davis, major 38th regiment, J. Gravell, lieutenant-col., commanding 38th regiment, J. W. Deane, major 38th regiment, and lieutenant-col. E. Miles, major 38th regiment, David Ross, captain 38th regiment, and major, James Kemmis, lieutenant-col. commanding 40th regiment, and colonel, Henry Thornton, major 40th regiment, Richard Archdull, major 40th regiment, Edward Hull, major 2d battalion 43d, Daniel Heane, major 43d, William Greard, lieutenant-col. commanding 45th regiment, Andrew Pattan, major 45th regi-

ment, Wm. Gwynn, major 45th regiment, D. Lecky, brevet-major 45th regiment, A. Coghlan, brevet-major 45th regiment, G. J. Walker, col. commanding 50th regiment, J. Ross, lieut. col., commanding 2d battalion of 52d regiment, H. Redwood, major 52d regiment, W. G. Davy, major 5th battalion 60th regiment, W. Woodgate, major 5th battalion 90th regiment, John Gaffe, brevet-major 60th regiment, D. Pack, lieut. col., commanding 71st regiment, D. Campbell, major 71st regiment, Harry Eyre, major, commanding 82d regiment, Chichester M'Donall, major 82d regiment, J. Robinson, lieut. col., commanding 91st regiment, J. Douglas, major 91st regiment, B. H. Otley, major 91st regiment, and lieut. colonel, D. M'Donnell, captain 91st regiment, and major, Robert Travers, major, commanding 95th regiment.—STAFF: Henry Torrens, lieut. col. and military secretary, Geo. Tucker, lieut. col. and deputy adjutant general, Thomas Arbuthnot, major and deputy assistant-general, Andrew Pattan, do. do. do., Wm. Gunn, do. do. do., D. Lecky, do. do. do., A. Coghlan, do. do. do., James Bathurst, lieut. col. and deputy quarter-master-general, J. Painy, assistant deputy quarter-master-general.—To which, by their particular request, are added the names of lieutenant-col. Walsh, and the field officers of the 2d battalion of the 9th regiment, which arrived previous to the 21st of August and served in that action.

Camp at St. Anna, near Lisbon, Sept. 18, 1808.—Sir, It has happily fallen to my lot as the eldest field officer in your army, to have the honour of presenting the inclosed address, from the commanding officers of corps, and field-officers serving in it; we have but one sentiment on the occasion, admiration of your talents and confidence in your abilities.—James Kemmis, lieut. col. 40th and colonel.—To the right hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. &c. &c. &c.

September 18, 1808.—Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of this day's date, in which you have transmitted an address, from the officers commanding corps, and the field officers who served under my command in the late operations in Portugal.—I have had more than one occasion of expressing the satisfaction which I had derived, from the state of discipline and order in which we were employed; and my sense of the assistance which I had derived from the officers belonging to the different departments of the army. These advantages rendered our operations easy and certain; and we were enabled to meet the enemy on fair terms in the field of battle.—I beg you

to convey to the field officers of the army the assurance that I shall not lose the recollection of their services; that I am fully sensible of their kindness towards me; and that I value highly their good opinion. I have the honour to be, Sir, &c. ARTHUR WELLESLEY.—Colonel Kemmis, 10th Regiment.

AMERICA.—*Mr. Jefferson's Answer to the Inhabitants of Boston, who prayed a Repeal of the Embargo. Dated August 26, 1808.*

Your representation and request were received on the 22d instant, and have been considered with the attention due to every expression of the sentiments and feelings of so respectable a body of my fellow-citizens. No person has seen, with more concern than myself, the inconvenience brought on our country in general, by the circumstances of the times in which we happen to live; times to which the history of nations presents no parallel. For years we have been looking as spectators on our brethren of Europe, affected with all those evils which necessarily follow an abandonment of the moral rules which bind men and nations together. Connected with them in friendship and commerce, we have happily so far kept aloof from their calamitous conflicts, and by a steady observance of justice towards all, by much forbearance and multiplied sacrifices. At length, however, all regard to the rights of others having been thrown aside, the belligerent powers have beset the highway of commercial intercourse with edicts, which, taken together, expose our commerce and mariners under almost every destination, a prey to their fleets and armies. Each party indeed would admit our commerce with themselves, with the view of associating us in their war against the other. But we have wished war with neither.—Under these circumstances were passed the laws of which you complain by those delegated to exercise the power of legislation for you, with every sympathy of a common interest in exercising them faithfully. In reviewing these measures, therefore, we should advert to the difficulties out of which a choice was, of necessity, to be made. To have submitted our rightful commerce to prohibitions, and tributary exactions from others, would have been to surrender our independence—to resist them by arms was war, without consulting the state of things or the choice of the nation. The alternative preferred by the legislature of suspending a commerce placed under such unexampled difficulties, besides saving to our citizens their property, and our mar-

to their country, has the peculiar advantage of giving time to the belligerent nations to revise a conduct as contrary to their interests as it is to our rights.—In the event of such peace, or suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers of Europe, or such change in their measures affecting neutral commerce, as may render that of the United States sufficiently safe in the judgment of the president, he is authorised to suspend the embargo. But no peace or suspension of hostilities, no change of measures affecting neutral commerce, is known to have taken place; the orders of England, and the decrees of France and Spain, existing at the date of these laws, and still unrepealed, as far as we know. In Spain, indeed, a contest for the government appears to have arisen; but of its course or prospects, we have no information, on which prudence would undertake a hasty change in our policy, even were the authority of the executive competent to such decision.—You desire that, in this defect of power, congress may be specially convened. It is unnecessary to examine the evidence, or the character of the facts, which are supposed to dictate such a call; because you will be sensible on an attention to dates, that the legal period of their meeting is as early as, in this extensive country, they could be fully convened by a special call.—I should, with great willingness, have executed the wishes of the inhabitants of Boston, had peace, or a repeal of the obnoxious edicts, or other changes, produced the case in which alone the laws have given me that authority; and so many motives of justice and interest lead to such changes, that we ought continually to expect them.—But while these edicts remain, the legislature alone can prescribe the course to be pursued.—THOS. JEFFERSON.

The President Jefferson's Answer to the Dissent of the Republicans from the Proceedings of the Town of Boston, relative to the Embargo.

I have duly received the address of that portion of the citizens of Boston who have declared their approbation of the present suspension of our commerce, and their dissent from the representation of those of the same place who wished its removal. A division of sentiment was not unexpected; on no question can a perfect unanimity be hoped, or certainly it would have been between war and embargo, the only alternatives presented to our choice; for the general capture of our vessels would have been war upon one side, which reason and interest would repel by war and reprisal on our part.—Of the

several interests comprising those of the United States, that of manufactures would of course prefer to war a state of non-intercourse so favourable to their rapid growth and prosperity.—Agriculture, although sensibly feeling the loss of market for its produce, would find many aggravations in a state of war.—Commerce and navigation, or that portion which is foreign, in the inactivity to which they are reduced by the present state of things, certainly experience their full share in the general inconvenience; but whether war would be to them a preferable alternative, is a question their patriotism would never hastily propose. It is to be regretted, however, that overlooking the real sources of sufferings, the British and French edicts, which constitute the actual blockade of our foreign commerce and navigation, they have, with too little reflection, imputed them to laws which have preserved them from greater, and have saved for our own use, our vessels, property, and seamen, instead of adding them to the strength of those with whom we might eventually have to contend.—The embargo, giving time to the belligerent powers to revise their unjust proceedings, and to listen to the dictates of justice, or interest and reputation, which equally urge the correction of their wrongs, has availed our country of this only honourable expedient of avoiding war; and should a repeal of these edicts supersede the cause for it, our commercial brethren will become sensible, that it has consulted their interest, however against their own will. It will be unfortunate for their country, if in the meantime these their expressions of impatience should have the effect of prolonging the very sufferings which have produced them, by exciting a fallacious hope that we may, under any pressure, relinquish our equal rights of navigating the ocean, go to such ports as others may prescribe, and there pay the tributary exactions they may impose; an abandonment of national independence and essential rights revolting to every manly sentiment. While these edicts are in force, no American can ever consent to a return of peaceable intercourse with those who maintain them. I am in the approach of the period when the feelings and the wisdom of the nation will be collected in their representatives assembled together. To them are committed our rights, to them our wrongs are known, and they will pronounce the remedy they call for; and I hear with pleasure from all, as well those who approve as those who disapprove of the present measures, assurances of an implicit acquiescence in the annunciation of the general will. I

beg leave, through you, to communicate this answer to the address, on which your signature had the first place, and to add assurances of my respect.—(Signed) THOMAS JEFFERSON.—To Col. Edward Proctor.

Petition of the Subscribers, Officers of Merchant Ships, belonging to the Port of Philadelphia, to Thomas Jefferson, Esq. President of the United States of America :

Respectfully Sheweth, that in consequence of the present embargo laws, the situation of your petitioners is grievous and afflicting; that they have been engaged in the mercantile service since their infancy, with few exceptions, and accustomed only to conduct ships or vessels across the ocean; that from the operation of the present restrictive laws, they find themselves cut off from their usual employment, and of course the means of subsistence are gone.—Your petitioners are well acquainted with the duties of conducting ships from port to port—well versed in naval tactics, but unable to handle the harrow or plough.—Your petitioners have for a long time borne with patience the privations incident to these restrictive laws, without murmur or complaint; but when imperious necessity compels them to disclose the cause of their grievances, they humbly suppose they have a right so to do in a decent and respectful manner.—Your petitioners, therefore, pray that your excellency will take their case into consideration, and adopt such measures as will relieve the wants of your petitioners; or, if there are vacancies in the navy to give to your petitioners, or some of them, an opportunity of serving therein, as they think themselves capable of performing services of that nature. They, however, submit their whole cause to your consideration, hoping your excellency will adopt such measures as wisdom and justice may point out, and as in duty bound will pray, &c.—Philadelphia, August 10th 1808.

The President's Answer.

SIR—In answer to the petition which you delivered me from the officers of merchant vessels belonging to Philadelphia, I must premise my sincere regret at the sacrifices which our fellow citizens in general, and the petitioners in particular, have been obliged to meet, by the circumstances of the times. We live in an age of affliction, to which the history of nations presents no parallel; we have for years been looking on Europe covered with blood and violence, and seen ra-

pine spreading itself over the ocean. On this element it has reached us, and at length in so serious a degree, that the legislature of the nation has thought it necessary to withdraw our citizens and property from it, either to avoid or to prepare for engaging in the general contest. But for this timely precaution, the petitioners and their property might now have been in the hands of spoilers, who have laid aside all regard to moral right. Withdrawing from the greater evil, a lesser has been necessarily encountered; and certainly, could the legislature have made provision against this also, I should have had great pleasure as the instrument of its execution; but it was impracticable by any general and just rules to prescribe, in every case, the best resource against the inconveniences of this new situation. The difficulties of the crisis will certainly fall with greater pressure, on some description of citizens than others, and on none perhaps with greater than on our seafaring brethren. Should any means of alleviation occur within the range of my duties, I shall with certainty advert to the situation of the petitioners, and in availing the nation of their services, aid them with a substitute for their former occupation. I salute them and yourself with sentiments of sincere regard.

“TH. JEFFERSON.”

HOLLAND.—Dutch Commercial Decree, dated 18th October, 1808.

Louis Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitution of the kingdom, king of Holland, and constable of France, has decreed and decrees as follows:—Art. I. The exportation, by sea, of the produce of the kingdom, hitherto permitted to be exported to neutral ports, is provisionally suspended until further orders.—Art. II. The superintendence of the coast shall be divided into three grand precincts; the first, extending from the Helder to the Isle of Walcheren, inclusive; the second from the Helder, inclusive, to Harlingen; and the third from Harlingen to the Jahde, inclusive.—Art. III. The commanders-in-chief shall be personally responsible for the execution of the dispositions that relate to the complete shutting of all the ports of the kingdom, and the prevention of all communication with the enemy, and likewise of all that we may hereafter decree. They shall daily transmit a report to our ministers of what relates to their respective departments.

(To be continued.)